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INTRODUCTION

We are nearing a tipping point in United States (U.S.) trade policy. Populism
from both the left and the right egged on by the rallying cry of the Brexit
campaign in Britain, with transatlantic echoes of “Make America Great Again,”
has played into nativist fears of openness, including fears of open economies and
free trade. Everyone seems to have an opinion about trade, and the prevailing
notion is that we are playing fair while the other guys are not. Free trade is out1
and something called fair trade, which remains vaguely defined, is in.2 The sense
that the U.S. is being wronged by allies and rivals alike is trumpeted everywhere.
Trade now is associated with job loss and trade deficits, mostly caused by
foreigners who do not play fair. Much of the corrosive anti-trade rhetoric has
taken on nationalist overtones and is targeted against countries such as China and
Mexico. The U.S. also has trade deficits with the European Union (EU)3
* Betty Hutton Williams Professor of International Economic Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law,
Chapman University; J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Political Science, Mount Holyoke College. The author
would like to acknowledge the generous research stipend awarded by the Dale E. Fowler School of Law.
1
Tim Hains, Trump Focuses on Free Trade Agreements: “We’re Losing Our Shirts”, REAL CLEAR
POLITICS (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/03/07/trumps_rust_belt_pitch_
when_was_the_last_time_you_saw_made_in_the_usa.html (“All this free trade, you know what, it is free
trade for them, not for us. We're losing our shirts.”).
2
Meghashyam Mali, Trump Threatens to “Break” Trade Pact with Mexico, Canada, THE HILL (Sept.
26, 2015) http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/255053-trump-vows-to-renegotiate-or-break-trade-pact-withmexico-canada.
3
U.S. Census data on foreign trade with the EU show that in 2014, the U.S. ran a trade deficit of 144
billion dollars and in 2015, a trade deficit of approximately 156 billion dollars. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
FOREIGN TRADE: TRADE IN GOODS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION (2017), https://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c0003.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
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generally and, for example, with Germany particularly,4 yet European countries
are rarely bashed. In fact, the U.S. trade deficit with Germany is larger than that
with Mexico5, and yet, Germany has barely been mentioned in the anti-trade
debate.6
Moreover, millions of jobs have been lost because of other factors, such as
technology and computerization—not trade.7 Job loss, due not to outsourcing but
to automation, has been particularly heavy in the service sector, where two-thirds
of all U.S. workers work.8 And the U.S. trade deficit, incurred when the U.S.
imports more than it exports, is denounced in isolation, without either a broad
understanding of how U.S. trade is linked to both national security and to
finances—that is, the U.S. dollar and its use as an international reserve
currency—or a deep understanding of the changes that are occurring in the nature
of international trade itself—such as the emergence of global supply chains and
vertical specialization.9 Trade continues to be conceptualized in old terms—
single-country or “monolocation” production. But in reality, trade is much more
complex, with value-added production in many countries. Production is
fragmented by task and involves “multilateral” processes10 using a “global factory
model” that transcends national territory.11 This antiquated understanding of
trade has resulted in misleading trade figures that overstate import figures and the
relationship between imports and job loss, with countries such as China and
Mexico.
The discussion on trade is muddled and anachronistic as well as increasingly
tinged with a nationalist, anti-foreign overtone that is directed only at certain
4
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TOP U.S. TRADE PARTNERS (2016), http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/
groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf [hereinafter TOP U.S. TRADE
PARTNERS].
5
In 2014, the U.S. trade deficit was $74,808 billion; in 2015, it was $74,849 billion. The U.S. trade
deficit with Mexico was $55,408 billion in 2014 and 60,662 billion in 2015. Id.
6
Yet,
Germany is arguably a far more pressing problem than any of the countries that
Trump likes to name-check: The Japanese economy is a poster-child of stagnation
and is running an aggregate trade deficit despite its reform efforts; a significant
portion of Mexican trade supports the US industrial base; and China has actually
started manipulating its currency to make it stronger it as it fights its own economic
slowdown . . . .
Tim Fernholz, Trump’s Choice of Trade Enemies Reveals the Racial Subtext of His Economic Appeal,
QUARTZ (Mar. 15, 2016), http://qz.com/638695/theres-one-country-that-reveals-the-racism-behind-donaldtrumps-economic-rants/.
7
Bernard Condon & Paul Wiseman, Recession, Tech, Kill Middle Class Jobs, YAHOO NEWS (Jan. 23,
2013), https://www.yahoo.com/news/ap-impact-recession-tech-kill-middle-class-jobs-051306434--finance.
html?ref=gs.
8
Id.
9
David Hummels et al., Vertical Specialization and the Changing Nature of World Trade, in 4 FED.
RES. BANK OF NEW YORK, ECON. REV. 2 at 94 (1998). Stating:
[G]lobalization has gone beyond just “more trade.” The nature of trade has
changed to the point where countries increasingly specialize in producing particular
stages of a good, rather than making a complete good from start to finish. This
vertical trade is also what links heightened international trade to greater international
production.
Id.
10
Made in the World, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2016), http://tinyurl.com/8ydmkfv (last visited Mar. 26,
2017); see also Paul Krugman, The Move Towards Free Trade Zones, in 76 FED. RES. BANK OF KANSAS
CITY, ECON. REV. 6 at 5, 15–18 (1991), http://tinyurl.com/kpn7e9e.
11
Global Trade System, in WORLD ECON. FORUM, NETWORK GLOBAL AGENDA COUNCILS (2012),
http://tinyurl.com/mrqrbgf.
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countries while exempting others. There may indeed be legitimate grievances—
against many countries’ actions, including those of the U.S.—involving subsidies
or dumping or currency manipulation—which can be resolved using trade rules.
But the national gestalt against trade distorts debate. For example, trade statistics
are being used to promote an intensely nationalistic and nativist view of trade in
which “the most important dividing line is that between American citizens and
everyone else . . . .”12 This inaccurate and racialist view of trade has been
compounded by rhetorical and false claims trumpeted during the 2016
Presidential race in the U.S. Candidates from both parties lined up to compete to
see who is or has been most vociferously against trade agreements. As a result,
trade has become a (dirty) household word, reflecting deeply held national
assumptions as well as shaping national consciousness about what trade is and
what it should be. Trade has become synonymous with job loss and deficits and
for many, constitutes America’s greatest economic threat.
This Article is not about the 2016 U.S. Presidential race, but what has come
out of the race about trade demonstrates the extent to which anti-trade beliefs
have entered the political mainstream. It is true that free trade has always been
controversial, bringing out anxieties and insecurities in the general population.
But in recent years, ritual condemnation of trade has become a daily occurrence
and is no longer confined to a few segments of the political spectrum. Trade has
become a toxic word and this distorted view of trade has become the new normal.
Although Hillary Clinton favored the accord while she was Secretary of State, as
a candidate for the President of the United States, she came out against President
Obama’s Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement with eleven Pacific
Rim nations. Her opposition ostensibly stemmed from concerns that the trade
agreement did not meet the “high bar” she had set, which was to create “good
jobs, raise wages and advance . . . national security.”13
Immediately after her denunciation of the TPP, she was herself denounced by
both the Republican National Party and her then Democratic rival Martin
O’Malley for “flip flopping.” O’Malley boasted that “[he] was against the Trans
Pacific Partnership months and months ago”14 and compared the TPP to the much
maligned North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which he equated
with “shuttered factories and empty pockets.”15 In a blistering attack, Trump
called the TPP “the rape of our country.”16 Sanders went as far as to equate
support for free trade with incompetence, proclaiming of Clinton thus, “I don’t
think you are qualified if you’ve supported virtually every disastrous trade
agreement, which has cost us millions of decent paying jobs”17 and has been “a
12
Michael Lind, This Is What the Future of American Politics Looks Like, POLITICO (May 22, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-election-realignment-partisan-political-partypolicy-democrats-republicans-politics-213909.
13
Hillary Clinton, Commentary, If Elected President, I’ll Level the Playing Field on Global Trade,
Clinton Says, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.pressherald.com/2016/02/23/commen
tary-if-elected-president-ill-level-the-playing-field-on-global-trade-clinton-says/.
14
Russell Berman, Hillary Abandons Obama on Trade, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 7, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/hillary-clinton-abandons-obama-on-trade/409546/.
15
Id.
16
Nick Corasaniti et al., Donald Trump Vows to Rip Up Trade Deals and Confront China, N.Y.
TIMES (June 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/us/politics/donald-trump-trade-speech.html.
17
Daniel Gross, Why Bashing Free Trade is Paying Off for Trump and Sanders, FORTUNE (Apr. 12,
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disaster for the American worker.”18 Sanders proclaimed categorically that trade
agreements of the past twenty-five years have been “written by corporate
America and big money. They want to have an agreement that enables them to
shut down plants.”19 Consequently, using the language of workers’ rights but
playing on old themes of economic jingoism and nativism, Sanders has pithily
called Clinton the “outsourcer-in-chief” and pointed as evidence her previous
support for trade with China, Colombia, and South Korea.20 Standing in Flint,
Michigan in March 2016, Sanders blamed the city’s decline on trade with Mexico
and China: “Do you know that in 1960, Detroit, Michigan, was one of the
wealthiest cities in America? . . . But then what happened is corporate America
said, ‘Why do I want to pay somebody in Michigan a living wage when I could
pay slave wages in Mexico or China?’”21
Aside from the use of incendiary words like “slave wages,” the accusation is
also not true. General Motors began its gradual move out of Flint in the 1940s,
building new industrial complexes in the suburbs, and then in the 1980s, it
departed from Flint altogether.22 General Motors’s departure from Flint was
denounced in Michael Moore’s film “Roger & Me” in 1989—four years before
NAFTA and long before China became an export powerhouse.23
On the Republican side, departing from long-held Republican principles
favoring free trade, Donald Trump too has condemned Mexico, China, and poor
countries for ripping us off and he has thus threatened to withdraw the U.S. from
NAFTA.24 In his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention in
2016, he declared, “I have a different vision for our workers. It begins with a
new, fair trade policy that protects our jobs and stands up to countries that
cheat.”25
Like Sanders, Trump too sees trade agreements as “a disaster.” 26 But Trump
goes even further, calling these agreements fraudulent. “Every agreement has to
be fair. Every agreement has a defraud claim. We’re being defrauded by all
these countries.”27 As a result, “[w]e’re losing 500 billion dollars a year to China.
We’re losing billions and billions to Japan and Vietnam and India and Mexico is
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/12/free-trade-trump-sanders/ (emphasis added).
18
Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren and I Will Help Lead the Effort to Stop TPP, REAL CLEAR
POLITICS (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/10/07/bernie_sanders_elizabeth_
warren_and_i_will_help_lead_the_effort_to_stop_tpp.html.
19
Eric Bradner, The Clinton-Sanders Trade War, CNN, (Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/
05/politics/clinton-sanders-trade-michigan/.
20
Id.
21
Steve Chapman, Bernie Sanders’ Free Trade Mythology, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Mar. 10, 2016),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/03/10/bernie_sanders_free_trade_mythology_129928.html.
22
Josh Hakala, Flint’s Struggles Began with GM’s Move to Suburbs in 1940s, Historian Says,
MICHIGAN RADIO (Feb. 8, 2016), http://michiganradio.org/post/flints-struggles-began-gms-move-suburbs1940s-historian-says#stream/0.
23
Chapman, supra note 21; see also Danielle Kurtzleben, Fact-Check: Bernie Sanders, Abandoned
Buildings and NAFTA, NPR (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/06/469234776/fact-check-berniesanders-abandoned-buildings-and-nafta.
24
Referring to NAFTA, Trump said, “We will either renegotiate it or we will break it because you
know every agreement has an end.” Mali, supra note 2.
25
Donald Trump, Speech at Republican National Convention (July 21, 2016), in POLITICO, July 21,
2016, http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speechat-rnc-225974.
26
Mali, supra note 2.
27
Id.

2017

Cao: Pride and Prejudice in U.S. Trade

5

beating us both at the border and they’re beating us in trade.”28 Mexican leaders
are characterized as more “cunning.”29
Interestingly, other countries in Europe that the U.S. has a larger trade deficit
with are rarely denounced or even mentioned by Trump or any mainstream
Presidential candidate. For example, the U.S. ran a larger trade deficit with
Ireland in both 2014 and 2015 than it did with India.30 It also had a larger trade
deficit with Italy than with India.31 The U.S. trade deficit was larger with Ireland
than with Vietnam in 2014, although the U.S. trade deficit with both countries
was essentially comparable in 2015.32 The moral urgency to protect American
workers from job loss apparently peaks only when jobs are lost to non-European
countries. This fact has not attracted much mainstream commentary, except in a
few media outlets. For example, the following observation was made about the
racial subtext in Sanders’ anti-trade campaign:
Bernie worries a great deal about trade with brown people—
Asians, Latin Americans—but has never, so far as public records
show, made so much as a peep about our very large trade deficit
with Sweden, which as a share of bilateral trade volume is not
much different from our trade deficit with China, or about the
size of our trade deficit with Canada, our largest trading partner.
Sanders doesn’t rail about the Canadians and Germans stealing
our jobs—his ire is reserved almost exclusively for the Chinese
and the Latin Americans.33
Trump and Sanders thus represent the yin and yang of nationalist discontent, with
corresponding anti-trade stances that consist of one part nationalism, one part
nativism, and one part racialism.
In an editorial, Hillary Clinton too has chastised but a handful of countries—
“China, Japan and other Asian economies”—as she put it, for their artificially
cheap exports via currency manipulation.34 There may indeed be legitimate
reasons to be concerned about currency wars or currency manipulation and in
particular the dysfunctional relationship between China and the United States in
this arena, as I have noted.35 But when trade is demonized and accusations of
28
Donald J. Trump For President, Trade War, YouTube (Mar. 6, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=adeKc6dbsI0.
29
Daniel Bates & Kieran Corcoran, Trump Takes Incendiary Immigration Views to the GOP Faithful:
Tycoon Says He’d Fine ‘Cunning’ Mexico $100,000 for Every Illegal Immigrant Who Crosses Border in
Order to ‘Take Back Our Country’, DAILY MAIL (July 21, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article3157729/Trump-takes-incendiary-immigration-views-GOP-faithful-Tycoon-tells-thousands-U-Soutsmarted-cunning-Mexico.html.
30
The trade deficit with India was $24 billion in 2014 versus $26 billion with Ireland. In 2015, the
trade deficit with India was $23 billion versus 3$0 billion with Ireland. TOP U.S. TRADE PARTNERS, supra
note 4.
31
The U.S. deficit with Italy was $25 billion in 2014 versus $24 billion with India. In 2015, the
deficit with Italy was $30 billion versus $23 billion with India. Id.
32
In 2014, the deficit with Vietnam was about $25 billion versus $26 billion with Ireland. In 2015,
the deficit with Vietnam was $30.932 billion versus $30.405 billion with Ireland. Id.
33
Kevin D. Williamson, Bernie’s Strange Brew of Nationalism and Socialism, NAT’L REV. (July 20,
2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/421369/.
34
Clinton, supra note 13.
35
Lan Cao, Currency Wars and the Erosion of Dollar Hegemony, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 101
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fraud and cheating are unleashed, public officials tend to target countries that are
easy to bash—either poorer developing countries with few comparative advantage
or countries that are sufficiently different to and thus deemed “other,” such as
Japan and China; or workers in poor countries who can be dismissively
characterized as “desperate and low-wage labor around the world.”36
When it comes to trade with the global, non-white poor, charged language
tinged with prejudice and designed to provoke anxiety and anger is used:
“cunning”37 foreigners and their leaders “killing us on trade” 38 or “ripping us
off”39 and stealing our jobs40 while “laughing at us”41 even as we are being
“absolutely crushed”42 and “taken to the cleaners.”43 The trope that Mexicans, for
example, are stealing our jobs has been around for years in the immigration
debate and it is not hard to tap into this when the debate shifts to trade.44
Accusations that apparently resonate with a significant segment of the American
public are lobbed about recklessly. Mexico is equated with drugs and disease and
then in the same speech accused of “killing us at the border . . . [and] killing us on
trade.”45 The anti-trade debate in the U.S. is increasingly founded on “[t]he
incessant reliance on xenophobic (and largely untrue) tropes holding that the
current economic woes of the United States are the result of scheming foreigners,
especially the wicked Chinese, ‘stealing our jobs’”46 or that “economic
interactions with foreigners are inherently hurtful and exploitative . . . .”47
Trump’s denunciations of China included the claim that “[t]hey want our people
to starve. They’re taking our business away. They’ve taken our jobs away.”48
(forthcoming 2017).
36
Bernie Sanders on Trade, FEELTHEBERN.ORG (2017), http://feelthebern.org/bernie-sanders-ontrade/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
37
Bates, supra note 29.
38
Dan Primack, Is Donald Trump Right that Mexico Is “Killing Us” On Trade?, FORTUNE, (Aug. 10,
2015,) http://fortune.com/2015/08/10/is-donald-trump-right-that-mexico-is-killing-us-on-trade/.
39
Donald Trump, Presidential Announcement Speech (June 16, 2015), in TIME, June 16, 2015,
http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/.
40
Trump said, “[W]e’re being ripped off with China, ripped off with Japan, ripped off with Mexico at
the border and then trade, ripped off by Vietnam, and by India, and by every country.” India Is Taking Our
Jobs: Not Going to Happen Anymore, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Feb. 28, 2016), http://indianexpress.
com/article/world/world-news/us-presidential-election-donald-trump-again-blames-india-for-taking-awayamerican-jobs/; Andrew Walker, US Election 2016: Are Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders Right About
Trade?, BBC (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35981784; Jason Abbruzzese, What Do
Bernie Sanders and Trump Have in Common? This Message, MASHABLE (Mar. 20, 2016),
http://mashable.com/2016/03/20/jobs-inequality-donald-trump-bernie-sanders/#rxwnKyXEdaqr.
41
Mark J. Perry, Trump Is Completely Wrong About the U.S. Trade Deficit, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0316-perry-trade-benefits-20160316-story.html.
42
Id.
43
Donald Trump on Free Trade, ON THE ISSUES (Nov. 6, 2016), http://www.ontheissues.org/2016/
Donald_Trump_Free_Trade.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
44
“The trope that Mexicans were ‘stealing American jobs’ was commonplace among some bluecollar workers, and it offered a frame that conflated both capital flight and immigration into one convenient
and loaded piece of moral shorthand.” Fran Ansley, Inclusive Boundaries and Other (Im)Possible Paths
Toward Community Development in a Global World, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 396 (2001).
45
Hunter Walker, Donald Trump Just Released an Epic Statement Raging Against Mexican
Immigrants and “Disease”, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 6, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/donaldtrumps-epic-statement-on-mexico-2015-7. Trump sees trade with Mexico as even more problematic than
illegal immigration from Mexico: “I believe that my examples of bad trade deals for the United States was
[sic] even more concern[ing] to the Mexican government than my talk of border security.” Id.
46
Williamson, supra note 33.
47
Id.
48
Daniel Roberts, Here’s Why Donald Trump Is Giving Up Oreo Cookies, FORTUNE (Aug. 26, 2015),
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By contrast, again, trade with a European country is viewed through different
lens. Indeed, a country such as Germany could also be deemed a currency
manipulator, but it has not been the object of U.S. wrath or derision. As some
economists have observed, “Germany is, in many ways, the China of the
eurozone.”49 By ensuring that real wages and prices increase more slowly in
Germany than in other countries in Europe, “in the context of a fixed exchange
rate within the EU, Germany effectively devalued within the eurozone and
became much more competitive than its neighbors,”50 allowing it to grow its trade
surplus with Europe and the rest of the world. Critics have also noted that
Germany relies on state subsidies and supply-side policies aimed at boosting its
manufacturing sector.51 Even Ben Bernanke, the former chairman of the Federal
Reserve, has acknowledged that
in recent years China has been working to reduce its dependence
on exports and its trade surplus has declined accordingly. The
distinction of having the largest trade surplus, both in absolute
terms and relative to [Gross Domestic Policy], is shifting to
Germany. In 2014, Germany’s trade surplus was about $250
billion (in dollar terms), or almost 7 percent of the country’s
GDP.52
And, according to Bernanke, German policies have the effect of “reducing output
and employment outside Germany. . . .”53
What underlies the current trade controversy in the U.S. is the belief that
jobs, particularly manufacturing ones, should not be allowed to leave the U.S. and
that if they do, trade is bad generally and, additionally, particularly bad if shifted
to apparently undeserving countries like Mexico, China, and India. The
controversy is not just about job loss. More and more, anti-trade critics leverage
job loss to invoke nationalist pride and provoke with nationalist language.54 The
nationalist reaction against trade generally and trade with non-Western countries
particularly is partly founded on the fear that the U.S. is losing economically to
foreigners not like Americans and that American jobs are being outsourced to
them. Anti-trade critics have succeeded in constructing a frame in which plant

http://fortune.com/2015/08/26/donald-trump-oreos/.
49
Robert E. Scott, Exchange Rate Policies, Not High Wages, Are Why U.S. Lags China and Germany
in Export Performance, ECON. POLICY INSTITUTE (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/exchange
-rate-policies/.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Ben S. Bernanke, Germany’s Trade Surplus Is A Problem, BROOKINGS (Apr. 3, 2015),
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/ben-bernanke/posts/2015/04/03-germany-trade-surplus-problem.
53
Id.
54
Daniel Bier, Bernie Sanders’ Anti-Foreign Crankery, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC., (Mar. 7, 2016),
https://fee.org/articles/bernie-sanders-anti-trade-crankery/ (“The resentment stoked by nationalists like
Trump and Sanders is based on a nonsensical proposition, a mirage of high-paying blue collar jobs stolen
by conniving foreigners . . .”); see also Corasaniti, supra note 16; Tom Hall, The Economic Nationalism of
Bernie Sanders, WORLD SOCIALIST WEBSITE (July 1, 2015), https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/
07/01/sand-j01.html (describing Sanders’ anti-trade agenda as reactionary and nationalist, not socialist or
internationalist because Sanders “opposes the international unity of the working class, calling instead for
American workers to rally in defense of ‘their’ national state against foreign capital”).
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closings are deemed to be the result of social injustice—as viewed by populists on
the left like Sanders—or the result of fraud and unfairness—as viewed by those
on the right like Trump. As William Gamson observed about the effectiveness of
what he called “collective action frame,” three elements are needed: (1) injustice
(framing the situation—in this case, trade—as unfair or unjust); (2) identity
(creating an “us” versus a “them”—as in they, be it the global poor or illegal
immigrants, are stealing our jobs or have cheated us); and (3) agency (“we” have
the capacity and agency to change the unjust situation).55
Trade is currently viewed through this small, prejudiced lens and focuses
only on jobs and job loss. The incendiary language used to attack trade by both
mainstream Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. shows that, where trade is
concerned, the old divisions between right and left have blurred and both are now
united under an umbrella of economic nationalism and nativism.56 But as this
Article demonstrates, “most jobs cut in the U.S. and Europe weren’t moved. No
one got them. They vanished. And the villain in this story—a clever software
engineer working in Silicon Valley or the high-tech hub around Heidelberg,
Germany—isn’t so easy to hate.”57
In the U.S., more than 1.1 million secretarial jobs disappeared from the job
market between 2000 and 2010 because new software made it easy for bosses to
field their own calls and arrange their own meetings; according to the Labor
Department, over the same period, the number of telephone operators declined by
64 percent, word processors and typists by 63 percent, travel agents by 46 percent
and bookkeepers by 26 percent.58 Take the example of Pacific Gas & Electric
Company in California, which plans to replace twelve hundred old-fashioned
meters every day with digital ones capable of gathering information without
human workers—many making $67,000 a year—generating accurate power bills
and sending alerts to customers when the power goes out. Its meter-reading
department had fifty full-time meter readers in 2007. As of 2013, it had six.59
The emergence of what computer scientists call “Big Data” has made
computers indispensable for many tasks that involve the sifting, organizing, and
processing of data. The explosion of digital data, via sensors and bar codes, has
resulted in the transformation of the American work place. Every second, more
information is exchanged on the internet than what was stored on the entire
internet twenty years ago.60 Every hour, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. collects the
equivalent of fifty million filing cabinets’ worth of information from transactions
with its customers.61 Companies from Walmart to Google to Amazon have at

55

WILLIAM A. GAMSON, TALKING POLITICS 6–8 (1992).
Tim Rutten, Nationalism and Nativism Not Populism Fuel the Trump and Brexit Insurgencies, TIM
RUTTEN BLOG (July 5, 2016), http://www.tim-rutten.com/nationalism-and-nativism-not-populism-fuel-thetrump-and-brexit-insurgencies/; Jeffrey Tucker, Donald Trump’s Economic Nationalism Is Just Another
Form of Socialism, THE STREAM (July 15, 2016), https://stream.org/donald-trumps-economic-nationalismjust-another-form-socialism/.
57
Condon & Wiseman, supra note 7, at 8.
58
Paul Wiseman et al., Practically Human: Can Smart Machines Do Your Job?, YAHOO NEWS (Jan.
25, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/practically-human-smart-machines-job-052642993--finance.html.
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Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data, The Management Revolution, HARVARD BUS.
REV. (Oct. 2012).
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their disposal an enormous amount of raw data that they can use not only to digest
information about their customers’ habits, but also to figure out how to automate
tasks that humans now do, which in turn further accelerates automation and
human job loss to machines.62 Moreover, although automation in the past tended
to affect specific industries, today, computers are “‘general-purpose technologies’
used by all kinds of companies”63 and thus can be more disruptive across the
board.
Of course technology also creates new jobs, but not enough to make up for
the loss of jobs it destroyed or phased out.64 In the past, the destruction of the
horse and buggy trade also created the auto industry. But the astounding power
and reach of computers have led economists to rethink the economic benefits of
technology. Automation has not just affected manufacturing jobs requiring
“brawn.” It has also eliminated high-value, service jobs requiring “brains”—in
fact, any job that involves routines regardless of skill level, resulting in the
hollowing out of “the very jobs that support a middle-class, consumer
economy.”65 Jobs safe from machines are “abstract tasks that require problemsolving, intuition, persuasion and creativity. These tasks are characteristic of
professional, managerial, technical, and creative occupations, like law, medicine,
science, engineering, advertising, and design. People in these jobs typically have
high levels of education and analytical capability . . . .”66 Computerization and
automation have resulted in socioeconomic polarization, with job growth at the
high end and low end and stagnation for a significant number of workers in the
middle. “This bifurcation of job opportunities has contributed to the historic rise
in income inequality.”67
And yet, despite the fact computerization and digitalization are responsible
for a significant amount of job loss and unemployment, it is job loss due to trade
that has been trumpeted. In fact, as of 2016, the word automation has been
mentioned but once during a U.S. Presidential debate, by Senator Marco Rubio.68
It is clear then, that it is not job loss per se that is being decried but rather
only job loss due to trade and particularly, job loss due to trade with non-white,
poor countries. Bernie Sanders denounced General Electric for “[s]ending jobs to
low wage countries”69 and like Trump, singled out Mexico and China as well as
other poor countries as those the U.S. should not trade with. According to
Sanders, American workers should not compete against workers in poor countries
unless those countries “have standards. And what fair trade means to say that it is
62

Id.
Bernard Condon & Paul Wiseman, Will Smart Machines Create a World Without Work?, YAHOO
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/smart-machines-create-world-without-051025381-finance.html.
64
Wiseman et al., supra note 58.
65
Condon & Wiseman, supra note 63.
66
David H. Auteur & David Dorn, How Technology Wrecks the Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24,
2013), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/how-technology-wrecks-the-middle-class/?_r=0.
67
Id.
68
Brenda Walker, Presidential Candidates: Why Is Automation’s Job Destruction Not Being
Debated?, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 50 (2016), http://www.thesocialcontract.com/pdf/twentysix-two/tsc_26_
2_walker_3.pdf.
69
Bernie Sanders, Interview with the Daily News Editorial Board (Apr. 1, 2016), in DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 4, 2016, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/transcript-bernie-sanders-meets-news-editorial-boardarticle-1.2588306 [hereinafter Sanders Daily News Interview].
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fair [sic]. It is roughly equivalent to the wages and environmental standards in the
United States.”70 Economic nationalism from the left in this case would mean the
only acceptable trade is trade with the Western European world.
On the other hand, technological change is often viewed as a sign of progress
because technology has, in many ways, made life easier for many people.
Because it is scientifically driven, it is also seen as neutral and well, scientific,
and inexorable. It is difficult to demonize technology but easy to demonize poor
countries and blame them for economic ills in the U.S. “It doesn’t have political
appeal to say the reason we have a problem is we’re so successful in technology,”
said Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist.71 “There’s no enemy
there.”72
Relatedly, viewed through a nationalist lens then, job loss is often wrongly
equated with the U.S. trade deficit. Opposition to international trade stems from
the claim that the United States imports too much and exports too little—hence
the trade deficit. Yet, despite the term “trade deficit,” the trade deficit has more
to do with savings and investment than trade,73 as I discuss in Part I. Moreover,
even if one worries about the trade deficit, the procedure for how imports and
exports are currently recorded is misleading, revealing a flawed picture of the
trade deficit itself. Because so much opposition to trade is based on the visceral
belief that trade causes job loss in the U.S.—that is, job loss is caused when
imports exceed exports—this Article will focus on trade, the trade deficit, and
jobs.
The myopic lens through which trade has been viewed has led to a truncated
picture of trade and has severed it from other interrelated and equally important
parts. Before a new public consensus is formed and takes hold, this Article aims
to inject a bit of sense and sensibility into the issue of trade and job loss, using
micro and macro perspectives. It makes two main arguments. One, there is not
enough “zooming in” of trade to allow a deep understanding of the changing
nature of trade itself—fragmentation of production or vertical integration and
how this has affected our understanding of the relationship between imports and
exports on the one hand and job loss on the other. Two, there is not enough
“zooming out” of trade to appreciate the relationship between trade and related
areas, such as trade and national security and trade and finances.
With respect to the first point, Part I begins with an examination of job loss in
the U.S. and shows that blaming trade exclusively for job loss is wrong. It is also
wrong to assume that when imports exceed exports, the resulting trade deficit is
responsible for increased unemployment. The facts solidly demonstrate that there
70
Id.; see also Jagdish Bhagwati, Free Trade: Old and New Challenges, 104 ECON. J. 231, 239
(1994) (arguing that “even though a trade economist would normally consider diversity among trading
nations to be good, rather than bad, for mutually gainful trade,” protectionist arguments under the guise of
fair trade has increased because “protectionist demands are more likely to meet with approval if, instead of
saying that you need help because you cannot compete, you claim that the foreigner is gaining because of
his resort to unfair trade”).
71
Condon & Wiseman, supra note 7.
72
Id.
73
“A nation's trade deficit is determined by the flow of investment funds into or out of the country.
And those flows are determined by how much the people of a nation save and invest—two variables that
are only marginally affected by trade policy.” David T. Griswold, America’s Maligned and Misunderstood
Trade Deficit, CATO INSTITUTE (Apr. 20, 1998), http://www.cato.org/pubs/trade/tpa-002.html.
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is no correlation between a rise in the trade deficit and unemployment. In fact,
the correlation is actually negative. A strong economy usually results in a rise in
imports; conversely a weak economy and high unemployment usually mean
fewer imports.74 In addition, when the U.S. imports goods and services from
foreign countries and pays for them in dollars, those dollars are eventually used to
purchase U.S. goods that are exported to those countries or U.S. assets in the form
of foreign investment in the U.S., both of which in turn create new jobs in the
U.S. In this way, the trade deficit is an issue of balance-of-payments accounting
which, as explained below, balances out in the end because the dollars Americans
spend on imported goods—which contributes to the trade deficit—actually end up
in the U.S. again when “foreign countries returned to the United States by
purchasing assets here.”75
Part I also looks at the changing nature of trade in the age of globalization to
show that our traditional understanding of import and export is anachronistic.
This anachronism has resulted in “[m]isguided perceptions of competitiveness
based on gross trade statistics”76 and can create the false impression that the U.S.
imports more than it actually does, which in part foments even greater anxieties
about the relationship between the trade deficit and job loss. International trade
statistics can be misleading because they measure the physical flows of goods and
fail to capture the value added in the global production process.
Trade has always been about specialization. Countries specialize in
producing goods that they have a comparative advantage in and trade with other
countries that also specialize in accordance with their comparative advantage.
But “[t]he traditional notion of specialization is horizontal—firms or countries
become adept at producing particular goods and services from scratch and then
export them.”77 Today, much of trade is done via vertical specialization or
vertical integration78 using global supply chains. Data show that from as early as
2013, eighty percent of world trade, exports as well as imports, was conducted via
global supply chains.79
Trade now more than ever reflects
[t]he increasing interconnectedness of production processes in a
vertical trading chain that stretches across many countries, with
each country specializing in particular stages of a good’s
production sequence. This phenomenon . . . has also been
labeled quite extensively:
“slicing up the value chain”,
“outsourcing”, “disintegration of production”, “fragmentation”,
“multi-stage production”, and “intra-product specialization.”80
74

See infra notes 254–58 and accompanying text.
DOUGLAS IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 158–59 (4th ed. 2015).
76
LAUREN DAI, THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS: HOW GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS
CHANGE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 5 (2013).
77
Hummels et al. supra note 9.
78
“A country’s participation in vertical specialization may be defined as: (1) the use of imported
intermediate inputs in the production of exports; and (2) the export of intermediate goods used as inputs by
another country to produce goods for exports.” DAI, supra note 76, at 14–15.
79
Theodore H. Moran & Lindsay Oldenski, How Offshoring and Global Supply Chains Enhance the
US Economy, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 1–2 (2016).
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David Hummels et al., The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in World Trade, 54 J.
75

12

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 7:2

For example, the prevalence of global supply chains means that as inputs or
components (that together make up a final product) make their way through these
connected chains, they cross national border not one but many times, obscuring
“the complex role of frictions in shaping trade when supply chains span multiple
borders.”81 In other words, imported component parts are frequently used to
produce goods in a country that are later exported. Today, trade is often about
“trade in tasks” rather than “trade in goods” because trade “often occurs within
products, where for a single product, the US specializes in design, Korea
specializes in intermediate components, and China specializes in assembly, for
example.”82
Take the convoluted and complex trade history of a product described here:
National Semiconductor manufactures wafers at three
fabrication plants, or “fabs”: South Portland (Maine), Arlington
(Texas), and Greenock (Scotland). Wafers are then shipped to
the company’s assembly and packaging houses at Melaka
(Malaysia) and Suzhou (China) where they are subjected to final
testing and from where they are shipped directly to the
production lines of customers worldwide. . . . For a particular
project we could have a marketing engineer in Germany and
design engineer in Korea, a layout engineer from Santa Clara, a
production engineer based in Longmont (Colorado), and test
engineers in Melaka and Santa Clara.83
The World Trade Organization (WTO) thus has correctly observed that “[t]oday,
companies divide their operations across the world, from the design of the
product and manufacturing of components to assembly and marketing, creating
international production chains. More and more products are ‘Made in the
World’ rather than ‘Made in the UK’ or ‘Made in France.’”84
Although the U.S. trade deficit is real, trade statistics should be scrutinized in
light of changes in the very nature of trade and production. Any time a product or
a component crosses a national border, it is recorded as an export or an import.
But given the rise of global supply chains, it is now common for components to
be shipped across borders at different stages of production. Components may be
shipped out of the U.S. to another country where processing or assembly work is
performed and then shipped back into the U.S. for additional work before sale or
export from the U.S. The processed or assembled product that is shipped back
into the U.S. will still be recorded as an import—and as evidence, for some, that
the U.S. is losing on trade. For example, given the prevalence of trade in
automobiles between the U.S. and Canada, a significant part of the value of the
INT’L ECON. 75, 76 (2001).
81
Robert C. Johnson & Guillermo Noguera, A Portrait of Trade in Value Added Over Four Decades,
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 3 (Jan. 2014).
82
DAI, supra note 76, at 7.
83
Jyrki Ali-Yrkkö et al., Who Captures Value in Global Supply Chains, Case Nokia N95 Smartphone
14 n.12 (Elinkeinoelämän Tutkimuslaitos [Research Institute of the Finnish Econ.], Working Paper No.
1240, 2011), http://csf.rrojasdatabank.info/WP_196.pdf.
84
See Made in the World, supra note 10.
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U.S. imports is actually the value of U.S. exports of American-made goods
shipped abroad for minor processing and assembly work before being shipped
back into the U.S. for sale or export.85
The iconic Apple iPhone is made everywhere and thus nowhere in particular.
Therefore, U.S. import statistics as to the true origin of the product are
misleading. The design, development, and marketing—as well as the software
creation—are done by Apple itself in the U.S. But the parts that make up the
iPhone 6 are made all over the world. Take some of the more major parts as an
example:
the display comes from Japan; mixed-signal chips from the
Netherlands; flash memory from both Japan and Korea (via Samsung); touch ID
sensor from Taiwan; batteries from South Korea and China; chipsets and
processors from South Korea, Taiwan, and the U.S.; accelerometer from
Germany and the U.S.; and the transmitter and amplification modules,
semiconductors, Facetime camera chip, display screen and glass from the U.S.
These parts are finally assembled by Foxconn, a Taiwanese company, at its plant
located in Shenzhen, China.86
U.S. imports of iPhones from China—because China is the final assembly
site—at a unit cost of $179 in 2009, added $1.9 billion to the U.S. trade deficit
with China for the year, although the assembly cost by Foxconn in China
constituted only $6.50 per unit and about 3.6 percent of the total manufacturing
cost.87 The U.S. credits all of the $179 dollars to China, distorting China’s export
value and the trade deficit imbalance with China. If one were to disaggregate
each value of each production process along the global supply chain, one would
see that of the two billion dollar iPhone export from China, “96.4% is actually the
transfer from Germany ($326 million), Japan ($670 million), Korea ($259
million), the U.S. ($108 million) and others ($ 542 million). All of these
countries are involved in the iPhone production chain.”88
That the U.S. runs a trade deficit generally and with China particularly is
without doubt. But facts matter and conventional trade statistics are obsolete in a
world where production is characterized by fragmentation and cross-country
movement of parts and components. In the iPhone example, these figures
exaggerate China’s export volume as well as the U.S.-China trade imbalance.
Such distortions facilitate the demonization of trade and trade with China and

85
IRWIN, supra note 75, at 18. Indeed, given the prevalence of international production networks,
much of U.S. trade is actually trading of goods between sister companies—that is, intrafirm trade between
one firm that is related to another firm. In 2013, fifty percent of imports into the U.S. and thirty percent of
exports from the U.S. were done between affiliated companies. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. GOODS
TRADE: IMPORTS & EXPORTS BY RELATED-PARTIES 2013 at 1 (2014), https://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/Press-Release/2013pr/aip/related_party/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2017). The fear that the U.S. is losing
and that other countries are winning because U.S. imports exceed exports is thus also unfounded, at least
with respect to the trade deficit issue.
86
Christopher Minasians, Where Are the iPhone, iPad and Mac Designed, Made and Assembled? A
Comprehensive Breakdown of Apple's Product Supply Chain, MACWORLD (Apr. 18, 2016),
http://www.macworld.co.uk/feature/apple/are-apple-products-truly-designed-in-california-made-in-chinaiphonese-3633832/.
87
Yuqing Xing, How the iPhone Widens the US Trade Deficit with China, CENTER FOR ECON. &
POLICY RESEARCH (Apr. 10, 2011), http://voxeu.org/article/how-iphone-widens-us-trade-deficit-china.
88
Id. When Bernie Sanders stated that Apple should be “manufacturing some of their devices here, in
the United States, rather than in China,” he too is assuming that China actually manufactures the iPhone,
that is, including its component parts. See Sanders Daily News Interview, supra note 69.
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paint a gloom-and-doom picture of supposed U.S. economic decline that is more
fiction than fact.
Other examples discussed below show that even in
manufacturing, the U.S. maintains a comparative advantage in the upstream
segment of globalized production.
In addition to the need to zoom in and see how the nature of trade itself has
changed and the consequences of this change on how one understands the trade
deficit and job loss, it is also important to zoom out and see trade as part of an
international architecture that has maintained, for the most part, stability and
prosperity post-World War II. The preoccupation with trade, as if it were a
standalone story, has severed it from other interrelated and equally important
parts. Part II shows that trade must be viewed in a broader international order, as
one pillar in multi-pillar world with multi-pillar parts, each related to and
converging with the other. Part II looks at the relationship between trade and
national security on the one hand and trade and finances on the other.
For the post-WWII planners, trade was deemed an important national security
issue. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were
firm believers in the Wilsonian doctrine that free trade promoted peace and
security. As Hull said, “When goods don’t cross borders, armies will.”89 High
tariffs, competitive currency devaluations, and discriminatory trading blocs
adopted to combat the Great Depression had exacerbated the world’s economic
problems, leading post-war leaders to favor economic cooperation through trade
as a way to promote both peace and prosperity. Germany and Japan became
American allies after World War II, constituting markets for U.S. exports and
conversely, exporting their goods to American markets and accumulating
American dollars in the process, cementing the dollar’s rise and its status as a
reserve currency.
After September 11, 2001, the National Security Strategy of the U.S., issued
by the White House, specifically designated trade as a vital part of national
security:
A strong world economy enhances our national security by
advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world.
Economic growth supported by free trade and free markets
creates new jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift
their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and
the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of
liberty.90
In addition, the report noted the connection between trade and development on
the one hand—trade as an effective mechanism for lifting the poor towards
greater development—and, conversely, the relationship between development and
security on the other hand. “A world where some live in comfort and plenty,
while half of the human race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor
89
John Moser, Sanders and Trump Are Dead Wrong on Free Trade, THE NAT’L INTEREST (Mar. 29,
2016), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/sanders-trump-are-dead-wrong-free-trade-15614.
90
WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 (Sept. 17,
2002), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.
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stable.”91
This national security strategy, which has continuously highlighted the
linkage between trade and national security, and particularly the fight against
terrorism, has been reaffirmed by President Obama. President Obama’s 2015
National Security Strategy emphasized non-military forms of power, based
largely on “free markets, democracy, and human rights.”92 An economically
stable, prosperous and free world is better for the U.S. “The United States is safer
and stronger when fewer people face destitution, when our trading partners are
flourishing, and when societies are freer.”93 The report committed the U.S. “to
reinforce the core architecture of the international financial and economic system,
including the WTO, to ensure it is positioned to foster both stability and
growth.”94
Trade should also be understood against a broader international economic
framework. International trade rules are rooted in the post-World War II
economic universe established under the leadership of the U.S. At the insistence
of the U.S., the international financial system was engineered around the U.S.
dollar and its status as a world reserve currency, with the dollar convertible to
gold upon demand. That the dollar is the top international currency has given the
U.S. enormous benefits. Dollar supremacy means the world operates on a dollarbased international economic system, which in turn affects trade, as the Article
demonstrates in Part II. When countries export, they receive dollars. The more
countries export, the more dollars are used, further cementing the dollar’s unique
status, all to the benefit of U.S. economic and political supremacy.
Dollar hegemony has bestowed incredible privileges on the U.S. Most of
international trade is set in U.S. dollars, even if the exports are not destined for
the U.S. Oil—along with other commodities—is priced in dollars,95 requiring
countries that are oil consumers to accumulate dollars to pay for oil—mostly by
exporting their goods and services to receive dollars as payment.96 Oil producing
countries with excess dollar profits invest them in U.S. debt securities.
International debt securities are in dollars. The world’s central banks hold the
majority of their reserves in dollars. Under the Bretton Woods system, the U.S.
undertook to convert dollars into gold upon demand and the gold-dollar exchange
rate was valued at $35 dollars per ounce of gold. Although the dollar-gold
convertibility upon demand was broken by President Nixon in 1971, the dollar is
still widely accepted as the world’s reserve. Thus the U.S. alone can print U.S.
paper money to meet global demand. Because the world continues to desire these
dollar securities, foreigners are also willing to pay more to hold them. As a
result, “Americans can purchase products at a marginally cheaper rate than other
91

Id. at 21.
James Goldgeier & Jeremi Suri, Revitalizing the U.S. National Security Strategy, WASHINGTON Q.
38 (2016), https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Winter2016_Goldgei
er-Suri.pdf.
93
WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 3 (Feb. 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.
94
Id. at 17.
95
See generally DAVID E. SPIRO, THE HIDDEN HAND OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY, PETRODOLLAR
RECYCLING AND INTERNATIONAL MARKETS (1999).
96
By contrast, the U.S. itself is able to purchase oil or any other commodities and products it wishes
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nations, which must exchange their currency with each purchase and pay a
transaction cost.”97
While Americans complain about unfair trade, foreigners have complained
about the unfairness of a system in which the currency of one country serves as
the international currency for all countries. For example, they “question whether
the U.S. should have been permitted to run current account deficits approaching 6
percent of GDP in the run-up to the crisis [of 2008].”98 They question why the
U.S. does not have to “worry about balance of payments crises as it can pay for
imports in dollars the Federal Reserve can just print.”99
While the U.S. can print the dollar, the rest of the world must accumulate the
dollar by producing and selling goods and services to others and get paid in
dollars in return. The dollars acquired by foreigners and accumulated abroad can
only come about if those foreigners export, and often export a lot, in order to get
dollars and save dollars as reserve. Getting rid of free trade or preventing other
countries from exporting to the U.S. market by imposing high tariffs could
accelerate the erosion of dollar hegemony as other currencies vie to dethrone the
dollar and replace it with a new reserve currency.
Much has been written about trade and this Article will not rehash the
substantial and thoughtful scholarship devoted to the pro-trade and proglobalization versus the anti-trade and anti-globalization debate. There is no
doubt that certain jobs have indeed moved out of the U.S. because trade
liberalization made it easier for production to be globalized. In a non-trivial
number of cases, “foreign competition has hurt many U.S. metropolitan areas . . .
which once had abundant manual-labor manufacturing jobs, often involving the
production of clothing, footwear, luggage, furniture and other household
consumer items.”100 Job loss and dislocation concentrated in certain sectors of the
economy will need to be addressed—although not in this Article—if for no other
reason than to alleviate political opposition to trade. It should be noted that
different proposals have already been suggested—from, on the one hand, trade
adjustment assistance programs101 and better job-training directed toward helping
people “reintegrate into the labor market and acquire skills, rather than helping
them exit the labor market”102 to, on the other hand, outright “bribes” to “buy off”
the “losers” in trade.103
97
KISHORE MAHBUBANI, THE GREAT CONVERGENCE: ASIA, THE WEST, AND THE LOGIC OF ONE
WORLD 71 (2014).
98
BARRY EICHENGREEN, EXORBITANT PRIVILEGE 5 (2011).
99
Liam Halligan, The Dollar's 70-year Dominance Is Coming to an End, THE TELEGRAPH (July 19,
2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/liamhalligan/10978178/The-dollars-70-year-dominanc
e-is-coming-to-an-end.html.
100
Peter Dizikes, The High Price of Losing Manufacturing Jobs, THE FISCAL TIMES (Feb. 26, 2012),
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/02/26/The-High-Price-of-Losing-Manufacturing-Jobs (citing
David H. Autor et al., The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the
United States, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2121, 2159. (2013)).
101
Id. David Autor, who did a study on manufacturing job loss resulting from trade, suggested “better
adjustment assistance—programs that are less fragmented, and less stingy . . . [to] assist the minority of
citizens who bear a disproportionate share of the costs and still be better off in the aggregate.” Id.
102
Id.
103
Jim Chen, Globalization and Its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157, 212 (2000). As Chen
proposes, society should “bribe losers[;] [c]ash will do” because it is more cost-effective than import
barriers such as quotas, tariffs, subsidies or so-called voluntary trade restraints which are more expensive.
For example, instead of pressuring Japan to “voluntarily” cut down on car imports to the U.S. in the 1980s,
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To sum up this Introduction, the purpose of this Article is to provide a micro
evaluation of trade in two particularly thorny areas: (1) job loss; and (2) import
vs. export and the trade deficit in a trading system of globally fragmented
production. This Article also provides a broad, macro view of trade and its
relationship with other parts of the international order—security and finance.
This is because trade is a vital component of an integrated international system.
Looking at trade in isolation will result in even more incoherence and
disequilibrium, perhaps creating unintended consequences in ways that impact
negatively on U.S. security and finances. Trade is embedded in an international
order—it is linked to national security and to international finance and relatedly,
to the dollar’s unique status as a global reserve currency.
The U.S. is not losing in trade. The nature of trade has changed, but the
trading system is not rigged against the U.S. Indeed, rather than indict the trading
system and malign countries that constitute the global poor, U.S. nationalists
should instead see trade as beneficial to the U.S. and necessary to the continued
health of the postwar international system.

I. ZOOMING IN: JOB LOSS, TRADE DEFICITS, AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF
TRADE
A. Job Loss
In a market economy, jobs cannot be guaranteed. Companies have opened
and closed, moved from one place to another, for reasons unrelated to trade.
Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, for example, have both denounced Carrier for
its plan to move twenty-one hundred jobs from Indiana to Mexico.104 Trump
vowed never to buy Carrier air conditioners again.105 Sanders said that Carrier
has “betrayed its own workers” and “betrayed the consumers of this country who
buy their products.”106
But Carrier has moved many times. Between 1918 and 1921, Carrier moved
its headquarters, research laboratory, and production facilities from Buffalo to
Newark, and in 1931, consolidated everything in Syracuse only to later expand in
the 1950s into then low-cost areas in the U.S., such as Indianapolis.107 Fortune
500 companies have, as a regular course of doing business, shuffled headquarters
and business through all the different states. In 2014 alone, the following
companies moved out of California: Lockheed Martin moved to Maryland;
Chen observed that “American taxpayers could have paid $37,000 in 1984 for each of the 23,800
autoworking jobs at stake. The resulting $881 million welfare program would have been far cheaper than
the $3 billion that American consumers absorbed that year in higher car prices.” See id.
104
Ben Kesling & Beth Reinhard, Donald Trump Hammers Away at Outsourcing in Indiana, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-hammers-away-at-outsourcing-in-india
na-1461874021.
105
Heather Long, America’s Top 10 Job-Killing Companies, CNN (May 17, 2016), http://money.cnn.
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Rockwell Automation moved to Wisconsin; Northrop Grumman moved to
Virginia.108 A host of mergers also resulted in the following corporations moving
out of California—Pacific Telesis to AT&T in Texas, PacifiCare to UnitedHealth
Group in Minnesota, and BankAmerica to the renamed Bank of America in North
Carolina.109 Many corporations once based in New York left for other states—
Altria to Virginia; CVS Caremark to Rhode Island; International Paper to
Tennessee.110
If the claim against trade is that it facilitates job loss and hurts workers, then
the departure of a company from California does result in job loss for a California
worker whether the company at issue moved to Maryland or to Mexico,
Connecticut or to China. But no one denounced these moves and certainly not
with the sense of outrage reserved for corporations that moved abroad. As
Sanders said in an interview,
Let’s just give an example of a corporation that’s making money
in America, today, but desiring to move to China or to Mexico to
make even more money. That is destroying the moral fabric of
this country. That is saying that I don't care that the workers,
[sic] who have worked for decades.111
Perhaps it is different for a company to move from one state to another state
because despite job loss in one state, there is a corresponding job gain in another
state and the company is still within the country. But from that perspective,
opposition to trade is not truly founded on worries that trade hurts workers but
rather founded on nationalist grounds, that is, these jobs are American jobs and
while they can be shifted from one state, to the detriment of workers in that state,
to another state, they cannot be shifted out of the U.S. Opposition to trade then is
primarily grounded in economic nationalism. We should not import more than
we export because that results in the trade deficit, which is bad for the country.
Job loss is a proxy for a deeper anxiety rooted in nationalism.
What about job loss due to automation? That has occurred unabatedly for
decades. Technological innovation has been controversial when machines
replace workers. The history of capitalism is rife with examples of creative
destruction.112 In 1589, when William Lee sought a patent for his newly invented
stocking frame knitting machine to free workers from the tedious job of handknitting, Queen Elizabeth I refused, telling him thus, “Thou aimest high, Master
Lee. Consider thou what the invention could do to my poor subjects. It would
assuredly bring to them ruin by depriving them of employment, thus making them
beggars.”113 Labor resistance to mechanization led Parliament to pass legislation
108
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making the destruction of machines a crime punishable by death.114 The British
government reacted sternly to the riots in Lancashire in 1779, explaining in a
resolution that “[t]he sole cause of great riots was the new machines employed in
cotton manufacture; the country notwithstanding has greatly benefited from their
erection [and] destroying them in this country would only be the means of
transferring them to another . . . to the detriment of the trade of Britain.”115 Over
time, a shift in attitude more accepting of technological progress occurred. One
reason could be that industry became politically dominant over the artisan class;
another is that consumers, inventors, and even workers benefitted from
technology as average living standards improved.
In the U.S., nineteenth century manufacturing was designed specifically to
“de-skill” workers—that is, to displace the artisan shops, eliminating the need to
acquire skills through the simplification and mechanization of tasks.116 The tug of
war between machines and workers was long and rough. On the one hand, in
1955, manufacturers asserted that the lower costs of goods and services resulting
from automation would benefit the entire population and that the interests of
“wage earners” should not trump those of “the people as a whole.”117 On the
other hand, in 1963, the President of the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations [AFL-CIO] warned that job losses due to
automation could reach a high of four million each year.118 President John F.
Kennedy observed that “our Labor Department estimates that approximately 1.8
million persons holding jobs are replaced every year by machines.”119
Workers fought back and hard. There were strikes by longshoremen at
Atlantic and Gulf ports and printers in New York newspapers to protest the use of
automated equipment.120 The United Steelworkers and Kaiser Steel Corporation
signed a pact in which workers were assured that they would not lose their jobs
due to automation.121 In 1963, the railroad industry and five brotherhood
representing two hundred thousand employees fought over industry’s plan to
eliminate sixty-five thousand jobs resulting from technological changes.122
As early as 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson recommended the formation
of a commission to study the effects of automation on workers. In a litany of
examples, the following were noted:
At one plant, one man today operates one machine which
performs more than 500 separate manufacturing functions that
formerly took some 70 men to perform. . . . In a similar plant, 48
men using automated equipment today turn out a finished
product in 20 minutes. Before automation, it took 400 men 40
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minutes to do the same job. . . . In an electronics plant where 200
men used to assemble 1,000 units a day, only two men now turn
out just as many with the help of automatic machines. . . . A
three-man crew in a “robot” steel mill turns out 217 miles of rod
per day at more than twice the old rate and at one-tenth the old
labor cost. . . . A major Government agency, using computers,
has cut its clerical work force from 13,000 to 3,000 workers.123
Using the Department of Labor’s calculation, the American Foundation on
Automation and Employment stated that automation caused “the elimination of
40,000 jobs a week, or more than two million a year.”124
Fast forward to today. Technology has continued to eliminate certain jobs
but no longer with much fanfare. For example, analysts observed that “[f]actory
automation will result in a net loss of factory jobs. But if we don't automate, then
there will be a massive hemorrhaging. If we lose the ability to be efficient
manufacturers, then we’ve blown our economic future.”125 The U.S. auto
industry invested $80 billion in a five-year period in the 1980s to minimize the
labor content in its new cars, claiming that “the alternative—not having made that
investment—means the pain would be greater for more people.”126
Webb Wheel Products, which manufactures truck brakes parts, has entered
the automation world by using the Doosan V550M, a machine that can easily spin
a 130-pound brake drum, smooth the metal surface as well as drill holes, “all
without missing a beat. And it doesn't take vacations or ‘complain about
anything,’ says Dwayne Ricketts, president of the Cullman, Alabama,
company.”127 The Webb Wheel has spared the company from having to hire any
additional workers in three years while simultaneously enjoying a twenty-five
percent increase in production or three hundred thousand more drums.128
For years then, manufacturing jobs have been reduced by technology. This
trend has now entered the service industry as well, “which employs more than
two-thirds of the workforce in developed countries. Technology is eliminating
jobs in office buildings, retail establishments and other businesses consumers deal
with every day.”129 For example, the jobs of telephone operators in New York
City hotels paying $29.72 an hour are also being phased out as hotels transition
into automated phone services instead.130 Automation is most likely to take over
jobs that involve
repetitive tasks that programmers can write software for—an
123

Snyder, supra note 119.
Id.; see also William M. Freeman, Gains Are Noted for Automation, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 1964),
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/05/24/gains-are-noted-for-automation.html.
125
Thomas C. Hayes, Dealing with Overseas Job Competition, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 1984),
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/25/jobs/dealing-with-overseas-job-competition.html?pagewanted=1.
126
Id.
127
Condon & Wiseman, supra note 7.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Julie Satow, Automation Claims Jobs of Phone Operators at New York Hotels, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
18,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/nyregion/new-york-hotel-phone-operators-try-to-putlayoffs-on-hold.html.
124

2017

Cao: Pride and Prejudice in U.S. Trade

21

accountant checking a list of numbers, an office manager filing
forms, a paralegal reviewing documents for key words to help in
a case. As software becomes even more sophisticated, victims
are expected to include those who juggle tasks, such as
supervisors and managers—workers who thought they were
protected by a college degree.131
Start-ups account for much of the job growth in the U.S. and other developed
economies, as “software is allowing entrepreneurs to launch businesses with a
third fewer employees than in the 1990s. There is less need for administrative
support and back-office jobs that handle accounting, payroll and benefits.”132
Even universities have succumbed to the logic of automation—in 2013, North
Carolina State University replaced human workers with a high-tech library robots
called “bookBots” to retrieve books when requested by students.133
Indeed, “[t]he impact of computerisation on labour market outcomes is wellestablished in the literature, documenting the decline of employment in routine
intensive occupations—i.e., occupations mainly consisting of tasks following
well-defined procedures that can easily be performed by sophisticated
algorithms.”134 The growing wage inequality in the past years can be partially
attributed to the computer revolution, as “computerisation erodes wages for
labour performing routine tasks, workers will reallocate their labour supply to
relatively low-skill service occupations.”135 The computer revolution has created
a highly polarized labor market with high demand for high-income, high-value
jobs and low-income, manual jobs and correspondingly little demand for middleincome routine jobs.136
Jobs have been lost for different reasons. Some jobs have been outsourced or
offshored when companies move production out of the U.S.137 Other jobs cannot
be outsourced or offshored because they must be performed at a particular
location or because they require in-person interaction. The work performed by
cashiers might not be outsourced but can be automated. Lowe’s has entered into
a joint venture with a startup called Fellow Robots in which robots will perform
many of the jobs of retail workers. “Without ever needing a coffee or bathroom
break, its voice recognition software, fluent in multiple languages, and laser
sensor safety technology can do a better job than many of America’s five million
or so retail workers.”138 “[W]hile some will laud this triumph of technology in
terms of saving money, many others view it as a disaster for the low-wage, lowskill labor market.”139
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But automation is not limited only to low-skill. Golf caddies are being
replaced by a robot called the Caddytrek.140 Human workers are not needed to
examine medical scans because now there is software that can discern troubling
issues. Software is picking out worrisome blots in medical scans. Trains can run
without conductors. Cars will be driven without drivers. Computers can spot
profits in stock trades in milliseconds, sift through documents required for
discovery in court cases, report and record power usage via digital utility meters
at millions of homes.141
Automation is also changing how certain jobs are organized and performed.
Suitable Technology’s Beam, for example, specializes in “telepresence,” beaming
employees from one business where there is scarce customer demand to another,
where more workers are needed.142 Businesses can also opt to rent computer
power on an as-needed basis rather than purchasing expensive machines and
employing information technology workers to work them.143
Automation is now all the more appealing to industry because technology has
become “better, faster, stronger, more convenient and cheaper than before.
Contrast this declining cost curve with wages, which generally head higher over
time—even if they’re not goosed by legislation and don’t keep up with
inflation.”144 In fact, by switching to technology, not only are companies able to
save on costs, but they are also able to go around political change. “Union rules
and labor laws may slow the dismissal of employees, but no country is attempting
to prohibit organizations from using technology that allows them to operate more
efficiently—and with few employees.”145 Technology is seen as part of
inexorable scientific progress, embedded in the technocratic realm devoid of
politics.
At the same time, machines have become both less expensive and more
capable than ever. And young consumers who grew up with technology often
prefer to deal with machines—people line up to order food from automated
kiosks even when there is no line for human cashiers.146 Because of consumer
preferences, transactions are becoming self-serve. Ordinary consumers are
enabled by technology to do tasks for which companies used to have workers.
Verizon offers its customers a way to fix problems without calling and waiting for
a repairperson. Customers can download Verizon’s In-home Agent software,
which can assess problems in a cable box or the Internet connection and fix the
problem in minutes.147 Other examples148 include the self-checkout lane.
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Consumers who opt for using the machine themselves are opting in favor of
machine over the cashier who used to work that cash register. Buying
merchandise online means fewer salespeople at brick and mortar stores. Clicking
“yes” in an email invitation to choose meeting times means what an office
assistant used to do is now redundant. Booking vacations online means the
erosion of the job of the travel agent. Wendy’s, for example, has begun
transitioning to self-ordering kiosks. Carl’s Jr. and Hardee’s are planning to have
restaurants “entirely free of employees.”149 White Castle has also announced that
due to rising labor costs, it would either raise prices by 50% or rely more on
automation.150
Moreover, in the era of big data151 generated by and culled from electronic
messages, social networks, sensors, GPS signals, cell phones, and more, “large
amounts of digital information exist on virtually any topic of interest to a
business.”152 When budget cuts forced the Gary, Indiana public school system to
slash its annual transportation budget by fifty percent, the school district relied on
sophisticated software to create alternative, more efficient bus routes, resulting in
a fifty percent reduction of bus drivers from 180 to 60.153
Indeed, in a speech in 2015, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence
Summers warned that the biggest economic issue of the future would not be the
federal debt or competition from China but “the dramatic transformations that
technology is bringing about.”154 Although this issue has been studied in
scholarly circles, job loss due to automation has not been decried the way job loss
due to trade has been. It is easier to scapegoat Third World countries and scold
them for their low wages than it is to order technology to stand still.
B. The Trade Deficit
The U.S. trade deficit is undeniably real. But first and foremost, it is
important to realize that “the most important economic truth to grasp about the
U.S. trade deficit is that it has virtually nothing to do with trade policy.”155
Rather, “[a] nation's trade deficit is determined by the flow of investment funds
into or out of the country. And those flows are determined by how much the
people of a nation save and invest—two variables that are only marginally
affected by trade policy.”156 But this issue—the trade deficit, savings, and
investment—will be addressed later in this Part B.
For now, this section looks at one part of the trade deficit, the part that relates
to imports versus exports, leaving aside the issue of savings and investment for
later. When a country has a negative balance of trade where its imports exceed its
exports, that country is said to have a trade deficit. Therefore, “[a] trade deficit
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represents an outflow of domestic currency to foreign markets.”157 In the national
consciousness, trade with China is equated with “trade deficit.” Although many
of the concerns about trade with China are legitimate,158 it is important to focus
on facts and view the deficit in general, and that with China in perspective.
Although the world is indeed globally interconnected, it is also important to
understand that there are limits to global trade, even with China. Data breaking
down U.S. personal consumption expenditures into different categories—such as
durable goods (furniture, motor vehicles), non-durable goods (food,
clothing/shoes), and services (housing, medical care)—and relatedly into the
import content—particularly Chinese content—reveals a startling reality. The
percentage of American consumption expenditures on Chinese goods is only
slightly more than one percent.159 Almost twenty-five percent of consumption
spending is on nondurable goods such as gasoline and food and there is negligible
Chinese content in those categories. Where Chinese content is high is in clothing,
footwear, furniture, and household equipment, but even these categories
constitute only eight percent of total U.S. consumption.160 Moreover, even in
categories where Chinese presence is strong—such as clothing and shoes where
thirty-five percent of U.S. spending is indeed on goods from China—much of the
value is derived from intermediate components that were not made in China.
Thus, “after stripping out the foreign components (cotton, yarn, etc.) made
elsewhere, only 14 percent of spending in this small category is really going to
China.”161 The facts demonstrate that much of U.S. spending is on services that
are not as amenable to being traded internationally.
Anxieties rise when a country imports more than it exports and incurs a trade
deficit. To understand the trade deficit, the changing nature of trade in which
production is globally disaggregated must be untangled. Second, the issue of
whether imports are bad and exports are good must be further scrutinized. And
third, whether the trade deficit causes job loss must also be further examined.
1. Vertical Integration of Trade and a Much Needed Value-Added Perspective
As noted in the Introduction, vertical integration or international
fragmentation of production, as it has also been called, has meant that many
products are not made “somewhere” but rather, “everywhere.” Processing and
manufacturing take place across vertically integrated companies that are
themselves part of global supply or value chains transcending national borders;
and intermediate components used to manufacture one product might be a final
product sold by a subsidiary.162
The reduction of transportation costs and the proliferation of cutting-edge
technologies have facilitated globalization of production, which means that
157
Trade Deficit, INVESTOPEDIA (2017), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trade_deficit.asp (last
visited Mar. 26, 2017).
158
See Cao, supra note 35.
159
IRWIN, supra note 75, at 24.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
See Kevin B. Sobel-Read, Global Value Chains: A Framework for Analysis, 5 TRANSNAT’L
LEGAL THEORY 364, 368–69 (2014) (providing a detailed analysis of global value chains).

2017

Cao: Pride and Prejudice in U.S. Trade

25

companies now relocate different stages of manufacturing to different areas of the
world. Few companies make one product in its entirety in one country.
Production is sliced and diced into different tasks with each task centered in a
different geographical location. “Goods exchanged across borders, more
importantly, are only fragments of final goods.”163 Through global supply chains,
“intermediate goods are traded across borders and more parts and components are
imported for use in exports.”164
Global trade, nonetheless, still uses antiquated rules of origin to determine the
nationality of a product, and from such determination, assess the level of tariff or
which import restraints apply to such product.165 Therefore, trade statistics as to
which country the product is from, and relatedly which country the U.S. imports
the most from and runs the highest trade deficit with, are often unreliable.
Take as an example a car made by a U.S. manufacturer. No fewer than nine
countries were involved in its production, marketing, and sales. Thirty percent of
the car’s value went to Korea for assembly, 17.5% to Japan for components and
technology, 4% to Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts, 2.5% to the United
Kingdom for advertising and marketing, and 11.5% to Ireland and Barbados for
data processing.166 Although this car constituted an import, most of its cost was
still incurred in the U.S., with thirty-seven percent of the production value of the
car coming from America.167 To characterize it merely as an import obscures the
contacts embedded in its production chain and the relatively significant U.S.
footprint in this process.
Trade with Mexico has been singled out and denigrated because it is equated
with job loss and trade deficits, but the picture is more complex because of the
vertical integration or production sharing. Much of Mexico-U.S cross-border
trade is embedded in a formal production sharing arrangement, which means that
“[m]any imports and exports are therefore of a temporary nature as an item is
being produced. Cars built in North America, for example, are said to cross the
United States’ borders eight times during production, integrating materials and
parts developed in Mexico and Canada.”168 Production sharing occurs in other
industries as well, such as electronics, appliances, and machinery. Because
Mexican production processes are deeply integrated with those in the U.S., “a full
40% of the content of U.S. imports from Mexico was originally made in the
United States . . . .”169 Indeed, U.S. imports from Mexico actually contain a
significant amount of U.S. content. Therefore, a product may be formally labeled
“Made in Mexico,” but the product itself contains parts made in the U.S. by U.S.
163
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workers, which means that “a large portion of the money U.S. consumers spend
on Mexican imports actually goes to U.S. companies and workers.”170 For those
concerned about the imports-exports distinction, U.S. imports from Mexico
actually contain a significant number of components that the U.S. had previously
exported to Mexico.171
In the same way that an import labeled “Made in Mexico” may have as much
as forty percent U.S. content, another product, let’s say, labeled “Made in China,”
may have, conversely, very little Chinese content. A Barbie doll priced at $9.99
and considered “Made in China” actually contained only thirty-five cents worth
of Chinese content, mostly in low wages paid to the eleven thousand peasant
women working in Guangdong Province.172 Yet the entire export value of two
dollars—about one-fifth of the eventual retail price—was charged to China
although a chain of other countries was involved in the production process. Saudi
Arabian oil was refined to produce ethylene, which Taiwan used to make vinyl
plastic pellets that formed Barbie’s body. Her nylon hair came from Japan.
Cardboard packing came from the U.S. Hong Kong managed everything else.
“Eventually, after transoceanic shipping, domestic trucking, advertising and other
functions that employ thousands of workers in the United States the Anaheim
Barbie will achieve her full price, resulting in at least a $1 profit per doll for
Mattel.”173
As to the doll’s two-dollar export value, a portion was taken by each country
that participated in the production chain. Trade ledgers, however, ascribed the
entire two-dollar export value to China. In 1995, U.S. Customs reported that toys
imported from China made up a total of $5.4 billion, constituting one-sixth of the
total U.S.-China trade deficit.174 China’s actual share of the Barbie doll is
important because the continuing trade deficit in China’s favor touches U.S.
national nerves. As Arjun Appadurai, a cultural anthropologist, aptly observed,
“The America-China trade issue is a red herring. It fails to take into account a
much more complex set of values, of energies, of labour, and of nationalism
congealed into a package that carries the emotional label ‘Made in China.’”175
The trend towards global rather than one-country production is also reflected
in the manufacture of the iPhone and iPad. Apple uses suppliers to provide it
with the needed components in the globally fragmented production chain, with
Apple capturing the largest share of value. Apple retains most of its design,
software and product development, marketing, and other high-wage functions in
the U.S. For example, the company pays more in wages to workers in the U.S.
than to its entire offshore supply chain.176 Apple kept about 30% of the sales of
its low-end $499 sixteen gigabyte wifi-only iPad and 58% of the sales price of the
iPhone 4. In both cases, these are far greater than the value amounts received by
170
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any other firms in the supply chain.177 Second to Apple are Korean companies,
such as LG and Samsung, which provided the display and memory chips and
which garnered gross profits of 5% and 7%, respectively, of the sales price of the
iPhone and iPad. Next are Japanese and Taiwanese suppliers, which capture 1–
2% each.178 Each unit sold in the U.S. added between $229 and $275—the
amount constituting the estimated factory cost of an iPhone or iPad—to the U.S.China trade deficit but only about ten dollars in labor wages are paid to Chinese
workers.179
Given the increased reliance on global supply chains, it is important to
understand that
[j]ust because a country is the final exporter of a good does not
mean that it is responsible for the majority of that good’s
production. . . . [W]e can no longer look at official gross export
statistics to see who produces goods for whom. Because of the
global fragmentation of supply chains, we must isolate how
much value-added a nation contributes to the production of a
good in order to illuminate the true comparative advantage of
nations.180
The continued preoccupation with the manufacturing or assembly stage of
production ignores the “full spectrum of ways in which the generation of a
product constitutes the supply chain, simultaneously dictating the roles of the
firms within that chain and the distributions of power among them.”181
A value-added focus, as opposed to one focused on gross exports, is more
accurate when there is vertical integration of production because it “corrects for
the distortions of imported intermediates in gross trade to provide a clarified
understanding of the characteristics of a nation’s production.”182 In the case of
the U.S., if one looks at the electronics industry, for example, using conventional
gross trade statistics, one would conclude that it is in decline. If, however,
looking at the same industry using value-added statistics, one would see a much
more robust and optimistic picture.183
A report to the G20,184 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the World Bank, and the WTO recognized that the most
value in the global supply chain web is value in upstream activities such as new
concept development and research and development, and in a limited type of
downstream activities such as marketing, branding, or customer service.185
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Although a product’s assembly constitutes but a mere ten percent of the total
value of a product, as reflected in the final consumer price, “this 10% determines
the applied tariff rate. The remaining 90% of the final product's value is not taken
into account when determining the origin, and therefore the tariff.”186 Because
rules of origin do not rely on assessment of value but rather merely changes in
tariff heading, they “skew[] trade statistics, because the relative share of raw
materials, R&D, intellectual property, and marketing are not factored into the
total value of the product.”187
In reality, despite handwringing about losing in trade, developed countries
such as the U.S. and Japan remain dominant powers at the upstream of global
supply chains and “continue to carry out sophisticated tasks like design and the
production of intermediate inputs. Emerging markets like China and Mexico on
the other hand, tend to be relatively downstream, still focused on assembly to
some degree.”188 This reality is reflected not just in the iPhone, but also in other
electronics products as well, such as the Nokia N95 smartphone, assembled in
Finland and China. Researchers who disassembled the Nokia N95, examined its
six hundred individual components, and traced the product’s global supply chain
discovered that in both cases, European value-added share was impressively high
whether the device was assembled in Finland or China.189
In the former case, where the phone was assembled in Finland, the valueadded share of Europe was 68%; in the latter case, where the phone was
assembled in China, the value-added share of Europe was still high—51% even
though Europe had “little role in supplying the physical components”190 and even
though the phone was labeled “Made in China.” Europe’s capture of 51% of such
phones was possible because Finland and other European countries dominated the
upstream process—“branding, development, design, and management.”191
Although the final assembly is the stage that gives physical manifestation to the
product, it only constitutes two percent of the value-added.192
Broad conclusions can be drawn from the Nokia study and extrapolated into
other industries such as textiles and automobiles. The country of assembly
commands only a few per cent of the supply chain’s overall
value added in the case of an advanced industrial good. . . .
[T]he developed countries continue to capture the lion’s share of
value added generated globally.
Even in the case of
manufactured goods, it is services (both the ones provided inhouse as well as those purchased from outside vendors) and
various forms of intangibles (including returns earned on various
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forms of intellectual property) that capture most of the value
added.193
Nationalist anxieties aside, the U.S. is still perched upstream of global supply
chains, controlling more value-added, sophisticated tasks such as design and
production of intermediate products.194 In an era in which anxieties about
“losing” to other countries dominate the national discourse, it is all the more
important that trade statistics accurately reflect the fragmented reality of trade and
the role of developed countries, such as the U.S., along the supply chain.
Even in manufacturing where it is charged the U.S. has “lost” to other
countries,
value-added measures of trade demonstrate that far from losing
competitiveness in advanced manufacturing industries like
electronics, the U.S. continues to have a robust and growing
comparative advantage in these industries. The dramatic
difference in trend for the U.S. between analyzing comparative
advantage using the value-added and gross trade approaches
emphasizes the importance of helping policymakers interpret
official trade statistics correctly.195
The value-added data demonstrates that the U.S. has a solid comparative
advantage in advanced manufacturing, particularly in areas such as electronics
and equipment, which constitute the highest level of technology manufacturing.196
Studies confirm this observation: that jobs in the U.S. subject to the steepest
declines are basic manufacturing jobs and those subject to increase are those in
“innovative manufacturing”:
Innovative manufacturing jobs are those where the
manufacturing itself is innovative or proprietary such that
companies will want to keep them in-house. Some companies
have already begun to do this. GE Aviation, for instance, has
invested millions of dollars in over 30 sites in the United States,
with the latest advanced manufacturing plant being built in
Alabama in 2013.197
The point is that a value-added framework better reflects the proliferation of
global supply chains, and consequently the multi-country production process that
currently prevails in the international system. The WTO recognized this
emerging consensus when Director-General Pascal Lamy coined the phrase
“Made in the World” to introduce an initiative that would measure trade by value
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added rather than by the current country of origin rules because “traditional
measurement of foreign trade alone no longer suffices to explain how [the
country] fits into the world economy.”198 As Lamy noted, “by focusing on gross
values of exports and imports, traditional trade statistics give us a distorted
picture of trade imbalances between countries.”199 The WTO has further
acknowledged that “attributing the full commercial value of imports to the last
country of origin can skew bilateral trade balances, pervert the political debate on
trade imbalances, and may lead to wrong and counter-productive decisions.”200
The WTO’s “Made in the World Initiative” (MiWi) is designed to support
“the exchange of projects, experiences and practical approaches in measuring and
analysing trade in value added.”201 Its core objectives are to incorporate the
implications of global value chains and of the “Made in the World” global reality
into trade policy, including the use of value-added statistics.202 Trade is better
measured on the basis of value added rather than on the basis of country of
origin,203 which is inaccurate because it is premised on the notion that production
can be deemed originating in one country or has a distinct center of gravity
around one country. Some politicians have also understood that fragmentation of
production cannot be ignored and that how trade is measured and analyzed must
reflect this new globalized reality. Karel De Gucht, the European Commissioner
for Trade, explained why the current scheme is not accurate: it “is a bit like the
final runner in a relay team getting a gold medal while his team-mates get silver
and bronze. It doesn’t take account of the fact that the final result is the product of
a joint effort.”204 Commissioner De Gucht also observed as follows, with respect
to Europe,
when we look at trade in value as opposed to traditional
statistics, our trade deficit with China is reduced by 36%.
However, our overall trade balance does not change. Our deficits
with other partners, such as Canada or Japan for example, will
increase to offset these changes. We need to bear all these
numbers in mind when thinking about our surpluses or deficits
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with our trading partners. China, for instance, starts to look like
less of a problem.205
In determining where the product was made, one must take into account
the value (and the location) of the design, R&D, marketing,
transport, and perhaps even the sales (retail) of the final product.
Ultimately, these steps in the production process are equally, if
not more, important than the mere assembly of the product.
Moreover, these steps contribute significantly to the good’s
overall value. Indeed, the value added at these steps generally
exceeds the value of the production or assembly activities.206
Using this approach, it is obvious that service and manufacturing are linked.
The blurring of these two sectors has been referred to as “servitization,”
“servicification,” or the “manuservice economy,” and it has been suggested that
value added in those servicing phases of the production process should be
incorporated in a product’s rules of origin determination.207 A detailed
exploration of rules of origin is beyond the scope of this Article208 but, as a
starting point, one might stipulate that origin might be conferred on a country
where a certain percentage of the value of a product (for example, fifty percent) is
added to the final value of the product, taking into account the following stages of
the production process: research and development, design, intellectual property,
manufacturing, and marketing.209
Understanding how global supply or global value chains work also means
understanding that economies today are interwoven. Commissioner De Gucht
aptly cautioned as follows:
[I]n buying something from a distant producer instead of from
our neighbour we are actually doing the right thing for the
neighbourhood. . . . Because when you look at trade only briefly
you may jump to the conclusion that imports are bad for jobs
and so we should keep them out. . . . But the insights from global
value chains should help people to understand that imports are
valuable in and of themselves. Because today most people in
their own daily work have experience of a supply chain, whether
within a small company or a large multinational.
Few
businesses make a product from start to finish and sell it to a
consumer themselves. We might make a component, provide
legal advice or support the product’s sale through marketing.
But we know that our work depends on many other people for it
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to succeed.210
In other words, even through a purely nationalist, self-interested lens, it
should be clear that imports are not the enemy. Equally important is the fact that
because many products the U.S. imports, especially from developing countries,
may also contain a large percentage of its own U.S. value-added components, so
protectionism in the forms of increased tariffs, for example, would end up hurting
domestic upstream firms.211 For example, in 2007, forty percent of the double
counting in U.S. exports212 came from U.S. domestic content being shipped back
to the U.S. as imports, whereas nearly all of the double counting in China’s
processing exports came from imported, non-Chinese foreign content.213
Furthermore,
[b]ecause China is the final assembler in a large number of
global supply chains, and it uses components from many other
countries, especially East Asian countries, its trade surplus with
U.S. and Western EU countries measured in value-added term is
41% and 49% less than that measured in gross terms.214
This demonstrates that U.S. export producers tend to be upstream within global
supply chains whereas Chinese export producers tend to be relatively
downstream.215
Nothing in this section is meant to deny the decline of U.S. manufacturing in
certain sectors—for example, steel, textile, shoes—or the reality of the trade
deficit. Nonetheless, trade should be reconceptualized to take into account the
shift from single-country to multi-country production; from singular production
in the trade in goods to fragmentation of production in the trade in tasks. Put
another way, trade statistics should be “debilateralize[d]” in an era of
“multilocated” production.216 This reconceptualization is important simply
210
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because facts matter. First, as a practical matter, the new framework is a better
reflection of what is actually going on in the world. Second, reconceptualization
should result also in practical changes that have significant policy implications
such as more accurate information about trading partners.217 For example, as
noted previously, under the traditional gross trade statistics model, the U.S. has a
$2 billion trade deficit in iPhones trade with China for 2009, but under a valueadded trade statistics model, the deficit is $73 million, mostly reflecting labor
costs incurred in China.218 Third, more accurate trade statistics also show that,
despite nationalist denunciations of trade in the U.S., the U.S. is in fact still
competitive even in high levels of manufacturing; that gross trade statistics can be
misleading and U.S. high value-added activities are embedded in gross import
figures that exaggerate import activities; and that job loss can be the result of
economic shifts as well as technological transformation.
To bring further clarity to the trade picture, the next section zooms in some
more and looks at imports versus exports. This section shows that restricting
imports in one industry may cause harm to other domestic industries. More
broadly and more importantly for the purposes of this Article, it corrects the false
assumption that imports are good and exports are bad.
2. Imports Versus Exports: Two Sides of the Same Coin
Even assuming imports are bad, restricting them does not necessarily lead to
the desired result, which is presumably to rejuvenate domestic industry and help
domestic workers in the protected industry. For example, in September 2009,
President Barack Obama imposed duties on car and truck tires from China,
adding a 35% tariff to the preexisting 3 to 4% tariff for the first year, 30% in the
second year, and 25% in the third year.219 The tariffs did result in a 30% decrease
in tire imports from China between 2009 and 2011 but that did not mean 30%
more tires were made in the U.S. According to the U.S. International Trade
Commission, all it meant was 30% more tire imports from Canada, 110% more
from South Korea, 44% more from Japan, 152% more from Indonesia, 154%
more from Thailand; 117% more from Mexico, and 285% more from Taiwan.220
Domestic tire producers were also able to increase price with impunity as some
consumers switched to domestic tires, resulting in a total net cost to consumers of
$1.112 billion per year—$817 million due to the higher cost of imported tires,
and $295 million due the increased cost of domestic tires.221 The higher tariffs
“saved” about twelve hundred jobs which meant it cost consumers $900 thousand
per job saved, as the average worker in the tire industry made $40 thousand a
217
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year.222 This is inefficient to say the least.
Moreover, import restrictions also destroy jobs in downstream industries that
use imports as intermediate components. Given the prevalence of global
fragmentation of production described above, reliance on global supply chains for
the manufacture of a product means that the majority of U.S. imports are not final
consumer products but intermediate goods used by U.S. firms in their own
production. Trade restrictions that raise the price of such intermediate goods have
a negative impact on downstream producers that use those goods, which in turn
adversely affects employment in those downstream industries.
For example, it is well-known that the U.S. has protected the sugar industry
for years through “a Byzantine combination of price supports and arbitrary import
restrictions.”223 The high price of U.S. sugar caused by sugar tariffs has protected
huge sugarcane conglomerates and at the same time inflicted harm on U.S.
industries that use sugar, such as the sugar-refining and candy industries.224 In
2002, LifeSavers candy plant that used 250,000 pounds of sugar to produce 3
million rolls of LifeSavers per day and employed 650 workers in Michigan shut
down and moved to Canada.225 Citing the high cost of sugar—with sugar costing
twice as much in the United States as in Canada and Mexico—the company,
which was founded in Cleveland in 1912 and moved to Michigan in 1967,
rejected the $38 million incentive package offered by Michigan to keep the
company in the U.S.226
Other makers of hard candy in the U.S., such as Primrose and Brach’s, have
also relocated, blaming “their shifting production strategies on one culprit: U.S.
sugar subsidies that keep prices of domestic sugar much higher than prices on the
world market. In addition, tight import quotas make it hard to import cheaper
foreign-produced sugar.”227 Brach’s warned in 1990 that the company would
close its plant and move to Mexico or Canada “if it did not win federal approval
to import sugar at world trade prices. Because of the federal government’s
protectionist trade policies toward its own sugar growers, Brach’s is required to
buy more expensive domestic sugar.”228 In 2001, Brach’s closed its plant in
Chicago, a city once known for its many candy companies. In 2006, the U.S.
Department of Commerce reported that for the past twenty-five years, U.S. sugar
price has been two to three times higher than world sugar price, which has
resulted “in a significant competitive cost disadvantage for domestic sugar222
223
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containing products manufacturers.” 229
Employment in industries that use sugar as an intermediate component fell by
more than 11,000 between 1997 and 2002, at least 6,400 of which the Commerce
Department attributed to plant relocation due to the high cost of domestic sugar;
by contrast, employment in the non-sugar-containing food industry rose by more
than 30,000.230 Although there were only about 61,000 workers in the sugar
growing industry, and more than 900,000 in the sugar-using industries, trade
barriers were enacted to protect the sugar-growing industry; even then, it is
estimated that only 2,260 of those sugar-growing jobs were shielded by trade
barriers, which means that consumers bore $826,000 in cost to protect each job
that was saved.231
The same phenomenon—trade restrictions in one industry creating adverse
employment consequences in related domestic industries—can be seen in
numerous examples, such as the imposition of high duties or price floors on
imported flat-panel displays and semiconductors used by domestic makers of
laptop computers, causing them to shift production out of the U.S.; or the
imposition of voluntary restraint agreements limiting steel imports to help the
domestic steel industry but inflicting damage to the many more numerous
domestic users of steel, including auto makers such as General Motors and
construction industries with companies such as Caterpillar and John Deere.232
More than the fact that import restrictions often create other unintended selfinflicted wounds, as described above, is the fact that import restrictions also
negatively affect a country’s exports. Exports are generally favored by
nationalists. Imports are not. Despite the WTO’s acceptance of nominally free
trade rules, mercantilist vestiges remain so that although states agree to be
constrained by free trade rules, many still revert to old mercantilist ways in which
“[e]xportation is gain, but all Commodities Imported is loss.”233
The U.S., for example, aims to improve exports—but certainly not increase
imports. The Obama Administration’s trade policy consisted of the National
Export Initiative with the goal of doubling U.S. exports by 2015.234 Import tariffs
are justified on the ground that they protect American jobs. But in actuality, as
shown by the famous Lerner symmetry theorem, export taxes and import tariffs
have a symmetric impact on trade. If a country wants to restrict trade, it can use
an import or an export tax because their effects on the terms of trade are
identical.235 Lerner’s paper shows that although it is often assumed that exports
229
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are good for a country and imports are not because they can lead to trade
deficits—or that imports and exports are independent of one another—in fact, any
restriction a country imposes on imports also functions as an equivalent
restriction on exports. Import tariffs negatively affect jobs in export industries.236
On a general, intuitive level, it is not difficult to see that import restrictions
will lead to a decrease in exports as well. Exports and imports are not separate
and independent from each other, but rather they are “the flip side of the same
coin. Exports are the goods a country must give up in order to acquire imports.
Exports are necessary to generate the earnings to pay for imports.”237 For
example, if foreign countries reduce their exports to the U.S. because the U.S.
imposes high tariffs on their products, they will not be able to accumulate dollars
needed to purchase American products.
The two are intertwined in another way. Assume the U.S. reduces its tariffs
on Chilean imports, which will become cheaper to U.S. consumers who will then
want to purchase such goods. U.S. demand for Chilean goods will increase,
which can be met only when consumers in the U.S. (indirectly) sell dollars on the
foreign exchange market to buy Chile’s peso—to pay for Chilean goods.238 As
dollar holders increase their demand for pesos, the value of the dollar will decline
relative to the peso, or put another way, the value of the peso will rise relative to
the dollar, making Chilean goods more expensive and restraining demand for
them.
The point of the example is as follows: although it was the U.S. that lowered
its tariff on Chilean products—and although Chile made no changes to its
tariffs—Chile will end up purchasing more American goods. As explained
above, once the value of the dollar declines relative to the peso, the price of U.S.
goods in pesos becomes cheaper for Chileans and thus Chilean demand for U.S.
goods increases.239
The connection between imports and exports also means that trade
intervention aimed at restricting imports will be offset by restrictions in exports.
“Throughout U.S. history, large tariff increases have failed to stimulate greater
employment because any increase in employment in import-competing industries
was offset by a decrease in employment in industries that are export oriented.”240
This was the case in the 1930s as well when the U.S. imposed huge SmootHawley tariff increases to protect domestic industry and boost domestic
employment. The result was a corresponding almost one-for-one decrease in
exports, resulting in job losses in the U.S. export industries.241
In addition, given the fact that, as previously noted,242 eighty percent of world
trade occurs “either within MNC [multinational corporations] networks or
through supply chains organized by MNCs . . . [,] it is important to understand the
236
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impact of trade measures on today’s world in which trade and investment are
intertwined and in which the ‘us versus them’ mentality is fundamentally
misguided.”243 The prevalence of global supply chains means more than ever that
the U.S. export sector is intertwined with its import sector. “The biggest
exporters from the United States are U.S. MNCs and foreign MNC affiliates
located in the United States,”244 offering higher than average wages and benefits
paid by all other firms in the U.S. Blocking imports either through quotas or
tariffs would harm not just downstream American users of those imports or the
U.S. consumers but also U.S. exporters because multinational exporters “rely on
their international supply chains to keep their US operations competitive in
international markets.”245
More than fifty percent of American imports are affiliated transactions, in
which U.S.-headquartered firms import from their foreign affiliates or
alternatively, in which foreign firms operating in the U.S. import from their
parent corporations.246 Moreover, because more than sixty percent of American
imports are intermediate components for other firms located in the U.S., blocking
these imports will hurt those other U.S. firms, their foreign affiliates and foreign
firms doing business in the U.S. because doing so will impede the smooth
operation of companies that are connected via the global supply chains. “A tariff
on imported goods would undermine the strongest companies with operations in
the United States and hinder their ability to continue to pay the highest wages to
U.S. workers.”247
Return to the Apple example. As discussed previously, because the
manufacture of the Apple iPhone and iPad is done via a global supply chain,
Chinese labor and inputs constitute only between two and five percent of the total
value of the final products, with about six percent going to component suppliers
in other countries besides China and “overwhelming majority of the value [going]
to Apple itself and other firms in the United States.”248 More important to the
point made here about the symbiotic relationship between import and export
sectors, if Apple was not allowed access to lower-cost imported intermediate
components, it is not simply that U.S. consumers would be faced with higher
prices for Apple products, but, additionally, Apple’s exports would themselves
fall. This would have the effect of hurting the American export sector and other
U.S. workers in the export sector connected to Apple; market share of phones
would shift to other non-U.S. producers.249
There would be other ripple effects as well. Trade statistics highlight imports
and exports of goods—but that is only part of the picture. The American export
sector, which everyone wishes to promote and protect, is itself linked to the U.S.
service industry which contributes much of the value added to the research,
design, manufacturing, distribution, and marketing of U.S. goods. Data gathered
by the OECD reveals a breakdown of “the share of services that are embodied in
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each country’s exports and indicates the extent to which those services are
provided by domestic or foreign firms.”250 About fifty percent of the value of
exports of U.S. goods comes from the U.S. service sector, a figure that is
comparable to other developed countries, but is much higher than that of lesserdeveloped economies such as China and Mexico.251 This matches what was
discussed in the preceding section about the significant role the U.S. has in
upstream production and upstream servicing of products produced via global
supply chains.
Equally important to the discussion about the relationship between imports
and exports is the fact that the service component embodied within U.S. goods
exports itself contains a high level of U.S. content—96.5%, compared with 93.3%
for Canada, 90.6% for Mexico, 90% for France, 88.6% for China, 86.3% for the
Netherlands, 88% for Germany, and 84.2% for Sweden.252 What this means is
that not only do U.S. goods exports contain a high percentage—more than 50%—
of embedded services, but additionally that the U.S. content of such services itself
is very high—96.5%. The U.S. service sector is an important sector for the U.S.
economy and the U.S. has been able to retain a comparative advantage in highend services to the benefit of skilled U.S. service workers.253 Equally significant
to the point made in this section, this service sector is intertwined with the
manufacturing sector generally and more particularly with the U.S. export sector,
which is in turn intertwined with imports. Lines everywhere are indeed blurred.
a. Trade Deficit, Employment and Balance of Payments
Job loss—and job gain—happens for many reasons. Generally speaking,
economists believe that “the level of unemployment is determined more by the
business cycle than by changes in trade flows or trade policy.”254 Jobs are
constantly created and destroyed in a dynamic economy. Except from 1970 to
1975, high unemployment rates are not correlated with increases in imports as a
share of GDP and in fact, since the early 1980s, the unemployment rate has gone
down even as the imports-to-GDP ratio has gone up.255 The trade deficit usually
rises when unemployment falls and falls when unemployment rises; a strong
economy supports job gain and imports and a weak economy is associated with
job loss, which decreases spending on imports.256 In addition, according to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, competition from imports and relocations of plants
overseas accounted for only three percent of total employment displacement in
recent years; during the 2008 financial crisis, layoffs reached two million in 2009
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but less than one percent of those layoffs were due to imports.257
Critics charge that the U.S. trade deficit means that the U.S. is losing in trade
or that U.S. exporters face unfair barriers in foreign countries. “The obvious
implication is that, if other nations were to open their markets as wide as we have
supposedly opened ours, or if American companies became more competitive
against foreign rivals, we could export more relative to imports, thus reducing the
trade deficit.”258 Over and over, the trade deficit is used as evidence that the U.S.
is harmed by trade.
But to understand the trade deficit, one cannot see it in terms of imports
versus exports alone. One needs to see it in balance-of-payments accounting
terms. Balance of payments is an accounting of a country’s international
transactions, used to keep track of a country’s imports and exports. When U.S.
consumers and businesses buy imports, they pay for them in dollars but the
dollars “eventually return to purchase either U.S. goods (exports) or U.S. assets
(foreign investment)”259 which in turn boost U.S. employment. Sales of U.S.
goods or assets to non-U.S. residents are recorded as a positive entry or a credit in
the balance of payments and conversely, purchases of foreign goods and assets
are recorded as a negative entry or a debit. “While the data, itself, is neutral, it is
sometimes reported in ominous tones, especially when the numbers total up to a
deficit in the merchandise account.”260
The balance of payments is categorized further as the following: first, the
current account, which includes essentially trade in goods (airplanes, wheat, cars,
and so on) and services (tourism, technical training, concert musicians, and
financial services); and second, the financial account, which includes trade in
assets, mainly in portfolio and direct investments.
In accounting, the balance of payments balances, that is, by definition, “the
balance of payments sums to zero.”261 This is because
what a country buys or gives away in the global market must
equal what it sells or receives—because of the exchange nature
of trade. People . . . will generally not give up something
without receiving something of comparable value in return. The
double-entry nature of international bookkeeping means that, for
a nation as a whole, the value of what it gives to the rest of the
world will be matched by the value of what it receives.262
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Thus, the current account + financial account = 0. With that equation in
mind, this means that a country with a current account deficit will have an
offsetting financial account surplus. “Goods, services, and resources traded
internationally are paid for; thus every movement of products is offset by a
balancing movement of money or some other financial asset.”263 A surplus in the
current account by definition is offset by a deficit in the financial account—“if we
export goods and services, then we import financial assets of the foreigners who
purchased those goods and services.”264 Conversely, a deficit in the current
account by definition is offset by a surplus in the financial account—“if
Americans import foreign products, then we export our financial assets to pay for
them.”265 This means “American money and other financial assets flow out of the
country to foreigners.”266 Generally speaking, American money—U.S. dollars—
is mostly useful for American purchases and thus, “holders of American money
have a claim on American assets” such as currency, treasury bills, stocks in
American companies, government or corporate bonds, houses, office buildings,
office franchises, and so on.267
Take the following concrete example. If the U.S. buys more goods and
services from other countries than it is selling, then it is also selling more assets
to the other countries than it is buying. Thus, “[w]hile the Current account deficit
of recent years has received much media attention, there is little public awareness
that this trade deficit is accompanied by a surplus in the Capital (now referred to
as financial) account.”268 If a country runs a financial account surplus of $100
billion, it will run a current account deficit of $100 billion to balance its
payments.269
In 2013, the U.S. had a merchandise trade deficit of $704 billion and a
services trade surplus of $229 billion, resulting in a deficit of $475 billion, which
when adjusted for other factors,270 the current account deficit was $379 billion,
which was about 2.2% of 2013 GDP. In that same year, U.S. consumers and
corporations bought foreign assets worth $552 billion and foreigners bought $906
billion of U.S. assets, resulting in a U.S. financial account surplus of
approximately $354 billion.271 “In essence, for every dollar Americans handed
over to foreigners in buying their goods (our imports), foreigners used eighty
three [sic] cents to purchase U.S. goods (our exports), three cents (net) to pay us
interest, and the remaining fourteen cents to purchase U.S. assets.”272 These
assets include short-term financial assets such as stocks and bonds, direct
investments through mergers and acquisitions, real assets in real property, and
land.
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As long as foreign investors continue to demand U.S. assets, the U.S. current
account deficit is sustainable. But even if foreign investors were to stop buying
U.S. assets, the result can be a soft adjustment rather than a hard landing. That is,
if foreign investors no longer desire U.S. assets, the dollar will depreciate because
fewer foreigners will need to buy U.S. dollars to buy U.S. assets. Once the dollar
depreciates, U.S. goods will be less expensive to foreigners. This will make U.S.
exports more competitive and U.S. exports will increase. Imports will decrease
and the trade deficit will be reduced.
Viewed in a slightly different light, a U.S. current account deficit means in
essence that the U.S. is selling assets to foreigners,273 whose purchases of U.S.
assets allow the country to finance more investment than it could were it to rely
on domestic savings alone.274 “The necessary balance between the current
account and the capital account [now called the ‘financial account’] implies a
direct connection between the trade balance on the one hand and the savings and
investment balance on the other.”275 Foreign investment allows the U.S. to
supplement its relatively low domestic savings to engage in more investment than
it would have been able to if it had to rely on domestic savings alone. When
restrictions on international capital movement were lifted in the early 1980s,
foreign capital flooded into the U.S. For example, seeking higher rates of return,
Japanese investors took part of their capital, resulting from a high national
savings rate, from their domestic market and invested in assets in the U.S.276 The
current account deficit for the U.S. peaked at six percent of GDP in 2006,
prompting then Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke to remark that there was
a “global savings glut,” caused by the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves
by East Asian countries and the windfall to oil exporters from high oil prices.277
This huge pool of foreign savings was used by foreigners to invest in the U.S.,
resulting in the large U.S. current account deficit.278
The controversial U.S. trade deficit with China can also be viewed in the
framework described above. One reason for China’s trade surplus is that dollars
it receives from exporting goods to the U.S. are not used to buy U.S. goods—
which would have rebalanced the current account and decreased the trade
deficit—but rather, U.S. assets instead. China purchased approximately $215
billion in U.S. Treasury in 2013, swelling its foreign exchange reserves to $3.8
trillion at the end of 2014.279 Because China’s central bank sold the yuan and
bought dollars, it pushed up the value of the dollar and pushed down the value of
the yuan. The resulting devaluation of the yuan made Chinese exports less
expensive to U.S. consumers, contributing to the U.S. trade deficit with China.
Moreover, China pegged the value of its currency, the yuan, against the dollar at a
low rate, leading to additional charges of currency manipulation and devaluation
273
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to give its exports a competitive edge.280 It is certainly true that devaluing the
yuan could be viewed as an implicit subsidy for Chinese exports, making them
less expensive to U.S. consumers but also reducing U.S. exports to China. Of
course, another way to view this phenomenon is also to see it as “an implicit
subsidy to the U.S. Treasury since it enables the government to borrow at a lower
interest rate than it otherwise could.”281
The balance of payments model is much more complex than simple exchange
of money for finished products. “Contrary to the impressions we may receive
from gloom-and-doom news reporting, balance of payments accounting simply
offers us a number—a reporting of the aggregated record of trade flows.”282 A
deficit or a surplus in the current account which measures trade in goods and
services or the financial account which measures financial flows or claims on
assets is provocative because different groups within a country experience this
deficit or surplus differently. For example, a current account surplus—and a
corresponding financial account deficit—is usually favored by those who are in
the export sector. The U.S. exported more to a particular country than it imported
and is “holding their IOUs in the form of money or claims on their financial
assets.”283 A current account deficit—and corresponding financial account
surplus—means the U.S. is buying more goods and services from other countries
and so these other countries “are holding IOUs in the form of American currency
and other financial claims on assets.”284 It is important to understand that their
willingness to do so is a reflection of their trust in the strength of the U.S.
economy and its political system.
If the U.S. blocked imports to reduce the trade deficit, “net capital inflows
from abroad would necessarily have to fall”285 as foreigners would have fewer
dollars to buy U.S. assets or U.S. Treasury bills—because they could not export
as much to the U.S. The dollar’s value would depreciate since there is less
demand for it. U.S. domestic investment would have to be financed by domestic
savings. To encourage domestic savings, U.S. interest rates would have to be
raised which could slow economic growth and have adverse consequences for
business investment and employment.
The term “trade” is a broad term. Zooming in and breaking it down into
more specific components, for example, imports versus exports, the trade deficit,
current account versus financial account, trade in goods, and trade in services,
vertical integration and global supply chains, one can see that these components
within the trading system are all interrelated. The rhetoric against imports and the
blame placed on foreign countries for U.S. job loss begins to lose its potency
when an integrated perspective is adopted. In addition, the changing nature of
trade from monolocation production to multilocation production and hence the
increasing reliance on global supply chains means that traditional gross trade
280
Michael W. Klein, What You May Not Know about China and Currency Manipulation,
BROOKINGS (May 22, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/what-you-may-not-know-about-chinaand-currency-manipulation/.
281
IRWIN, supra note 75, at 162.
282
Lesson 6: The Balance of Payments Always Balances, supra note 260.
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
IRWIN, supra note 75, at 162.

2017

Cao: Pride and Prejudice in U.S. Trade

43

statistics about imports and exports are anachronistic and increasingly unreliable.
There is, in addition, a blurring of lines between “us” versus “them” when
products are “made in everywhere” and companies import intermediate
components from their foreign affiliates plugged into their global supply chains.
Blocking imports will end up hurting U.S. companies as well as U.S. workers,
both in the production of goods and the provision of services, as discussed above.

II. ZOOMING OUT: U.S. TRADE AND . . .

Part I zoomed into the subcomponents within trade. Part II aims to zoom out
and look at trade and its relationship to other priority objectives of the U.S., such
as protecting U.S. national security and ensuring the continued dominant status of
the U.S. dollar. In Part II, this Article will demonstrate first that there is indeed a
link between trade and national security and that despite this acknowledged
linkage, by the U.S. itself and by scholars in the field, the U.S. has too often
allowed itself to be mired by anti-trade rhetoric and the politics of trade to the
detriment of national security issues. Second, Part II also claims that no country
can have everything and can win in every arena, dominating every single
economic sector from low-cost processing and assembly to downstream and
upstream manufacturing and service as well as innovation and intellectual
property. The U.S. has incredible privilege flowing from a trading system that
reinforces dollar supremacy. To maintain this privilege, open trade is necessary.
A. Trade and National Security
In the post-September 11 era, “free trade, economic development,
strengthening international law . . . [are] tools [that] have to be considered in the
American portfolio of combating international terrorism.”286 It is said that the
fight against terrorism has two sides, the demand side and the supply side.
Whereas the supply side approach emphasizes security, the demand side
emphasizes the underlying socio economic reasons behind this security threat.
Free trade has an important role to play in this objective.
The political and economic conditions of many countries in the Middle East
are dire, characterized by “‘low growth, bad institutions of governance, and
resistance to economic globalization.’”287 Foreign direct investment and
international trade have been directed elsewhere, resulting in economies that are
dominated by government management and ownership and ill-equipped to
provide employment.288 Entrenched political elites operating in a system marked
by corruption, clientelism and patronage oppose reform,289 seeing efforts to
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change top-down management, for example, as a threat to their rule and survival.
The huge divergence between the interests and incentives of rulers versus those of
potential entrepreneurs is deemed one of the greatest impediments to reform, and
against that backdrop, economic liberalization should loosen the control of
political and economic insiders and consequently have a democratizing effect.290
Economic development is more likely to occur when poor countries are
plugged into rather than excluded from the international system:
“[T]he increased involvement of the WTO, multinational
corporations, international aid agencies, non governmental
organizations, and foreign investors focusing on the
development of non-oil industries through a process of market
diversification and stabilization will improve the lives of those
living in the Middle East,” thus rooting out all the causes of
terrorism.291
As Timur Kuran, a scholar on Islamic economies observed,
The West in general and Europe in particular has made a major
mistake over the past 15 years in sending signals that Islamic
countries are not really part of their world. The West has to do
more to encourage those people—really the majority in many
countries—who want to integrate, not turn their backs.292
At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, the consensus was
that states, multinational corporations, multilateral institutions, and civil society
all have a role to play in facilitating aid, trade, and foreign direct investment,
which were deemed the best avenues for ending poverty.293 However, as former
Secretary of State Colin Powell remarked, “[o]fficial development aid alone is not
enough. Countries must also be able to attract the trade and investment that
account for 80% of the money that is available for development.”294 A
comprehensive multi-country World Bank study analyzing real and financial
integration to poverty using indicators of trade and financial openness reveals that
at low levels of globalization, poverty is not likely to be alleviated but that at a
certain level of globalization and connectivity, the possibility for poverty
reduction is markedly improved.295 The study shows that “[t]he real problem is
the 50-odd very poor countries, which generate only 0.4 percent of world exports.
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Their plight is due to too little globalization, not too much.”296
In the case of investment, a 2002 study by the OECD found that despite
potential drawbacks associated with foreign direct investment [FDI], the overall
benefits are also clear: “FDI triggers technology spillovers, assists human capital
formation, contributes to international trade integration, helps create a more
competitive business environment and enhances enterprise development. All of
these contribute to higher economic growth, which is the most potent tool for
alleviating poverty in developing countries.”297 Because trade and investment
also need a basic, reliable rule of law framework, “free trade and trade
liberalization in general would be a catalyst for improving the deficient legal
regulatory rules and systems in the Middle East and facilitate the legal integration
of the WTO as well.”298
Since September 11, trade and development have been elevated to a firstorder national security issue. “[D]evelopment experts say that helping countries
to manage their economies better is as important to challenging the terrorist
vision as educational and political reform.”299 In 2002, the National Security
Strategy of the U.S. emphasized the promotion of trade policies that “can help
developing countries strengthen property rights, competition, the rule of law,
investment, the spread of knowledge, open societies, the efficient allocation of
resources, and regional integration—all leading to growth, opportunity, and
confidence in developing countries.” 300 And in 2006, President George W. Bush
called for global, regional, and bilateral trade initiatives
to open markets and integrate the global economy through
launching the Doha Development Agenda negotiations of the
WTO. The United States put forward bold and historic
proposals to reform global agricultural trade, to eliminate farm
export subsidies and reduce trade-distorting support programs, to
eliminate all tariffs on consumer and industrial goods, and to
open global services markets.301
Emphasis has been on negotiating free trade agreements with countries all over
the world, particularly the Middle East, and this strategy has continued into the
administration of President Barack Obama. For example, the National Security
Strategy of the U.S. in 2015 continued to consist of reinforcing the basic
international economic order, including the WTO’s trading regime precisely
because the U.S. sees it as being crucial to promoting economic stability and
growth.302
Over and over, the mantra between trade and national security has been
296

Id. at 1.
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT:
MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, MINIMIZING COSTS (2002).
298
Hassanien, supra note 286, at 236.
299
Kahn, supra note 292.
300
WHITE HOUSE, supra note 90, at 19.
301
WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 25 (Mar. 16,
2006), https://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf.
302
White House, supra note 93, at 17.
297

46

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 7:2

repeated. Right after September 11, 2001, Robert Zoellick, then U.S. Trade
Representative wrote that in the face of terrorist attacks, “U.S. leadership in
promoting the international economic and trading system is vital. Trade is about
more than economic efficiency. It promotes the values at the heart of this
protracted struggle.”303 Zoellick correctly reminded the public that Congress had
used free trade “as a cure for the protectionism of the Great Depression and then
to help Harry Truman revise a devastated world,”304 granting the President
negotiating authority to enter into trade agreements to ensure open markets.
Zoellick urged the U.S. to finalize its free trade agreement with Jordan,305 the first
such agreement with the Arab world and with Vietnam, a former enemy that was
pivoting away from Marxism and towards a market economy.
Despite proclamations about the link between trade and national security, in
reality, it has not always been easy to use trade to further national security
objectives. Take the example of Pakistan after September 11, which functions
below as a case study into how priorities of different branches of government
often conflict. Even wartime exigencies could not pry loose the entrenched
protectionist interests of the powerful textile and apparel industry. Battle lines
were drawn, pitting
two critical American policy interests on a collision course. On
one side is the imperative to promote U.S. security by shoring up
Pakistan and other allies in the Muslim world. On the other side
is the perennial pressure to support domestic manufacturers of
textiles and other products that seek desperately to preserve
trade constraints on those very same countries.306
Despite Pakistan’s crucial role in the fight against terror and then Pakistani
President Musharraf’s promise to help the U.S. locate Osama Bin Laden,
President Bush’s concerted efforts to reciprocate by helping Pakistan’s exports to
the U.S. were thwarted. After September 11, private U.S. companies retreated
from the volatile country. Insurance companies increased their premiums for
insuring shipments from Pakistan.307 U.S. apparel manufacturers like Tommy
Hilfiger, American Eagle, and Perry Ellis cut down on business with Pakistani
firms.308 Maintaining its textile and apparel industry employing sixty percent of
the country’s industrial workers was a priority for Pakistan because its exports
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totaled $5.8 billion, with $1.9 billion to the United States alone.309 Layoffs of
tens of thousands of Pakistani textile workers “contribut[ed] to resentment of the
United States among many young Pakistanis . . . while mullahs at radical local
mosques . . . play[ed] on anger over job losses in their sermons.”310
Alan Larson, the former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Economic,
Business, and Agricultural Affairs, urged American importers to continue doing
business with Pakistani suppliers.311 Wendy Chamberlin, the U.S. ambassador to
Pakistan, announced, in a twist to the conventional “Buy American” slogan, that
“[t]he patriotic thing to do if you’re American is to buy Pakistani products.”312
The statement prompted a scathing retort from a spokesman of Representative
Howard Coble, Republican from North Carolina: “My boss said he’d like to have
someone stick a sock in her mouth—an American-made sock at that.”313
President Bush had the authority under the auspices of the Committee for the
Implementation of Textile Agreements chaired by the Department of Commerce
to modify textiles quotas.314 But tariffs required Congressional action, and
President Bush prodded Kansas Senator Sam Brownback to sponsor legislation
granting the president authority to lower Pakistani tariffs. In the midst of the war
in Afghanistan, it was widely assumed that Congress would not oppose the
President’s initiatives to help lift Pakistan. Indeed, under the first Bush
Administration, the U.S. had increased textile quotas by fifty percent for Turkey
“as a reward for its help in the 1991 Persian Gulf war.”315
But the textile and apparel industry fought hard against the possibility of
increased textile imports from Pakistan.
Under pressure from textile
manufacturers in their states, then Senator Jesse Helms from North Carolina and
Senator Fritz Hollings from South Carolina warned President Bush that “[t]hese
Americans [textile workers] must not be made pawns in efforts to build an
international coalition.”316
A fierce battle ensued. Developed countries had successfully exempted
textile, apparel, and agriculture from the liberalization regime of the international
trading system since the beginning of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in 1948, although WTO rules in 1995 had obligated that such
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those exclusions be phased out.317 The U.S. saw U.S. reduction of tariffs and
expansion of quotas as a needed boost for President Musharraf who was himself
under attack by conservative and Islamist domestic critics for his support of the
U.S.318 It was widely acknowledged that
if President Bush wants to reach out to U.S. Muslim allies, there
are few better things he can do than allow them greater access to
the U.S. textile market. Exporting textiles has long been a
critical first step that poorer nations can take on the road to
becoming full participants in the world economy.319
In addition, the Bush administration “hoped trade concessions would help
bolster the image of the U.S. in Pakistan—and in the Muslim world generally—
by demonstrating America’s desire to directly aid the workers of an Islamic
country.”320 As the State Department’s Alan Larson stated, “As much as people
in Pakistan clamored for and benefited from debt reduction and from increased
aid, those are all things that are channeled through government, whereas trade
benefits are more immediately felt by people.”321
The Pakistani government also hired lobbyists to promote its case. In 2002,
pressure on the U.S. increased when the EU announced it would allow Pakistani
textile and apparel products to enter its market duty-free.322 The Bush
Administration drafted a proposal that would have granted President Bush
authority, renewable until 2004, to reduce or eliminate tariffs on textile or apparel
imports from Pakistan if the President determined that Pakistan’s aid was critical
and that as a result, Pakistan was suffering “substantial economic harm.”323
In the end, Congressional opposition, not just to trade concessions for
Pakistan but also to fast track,324 made the Administration scale back its efforts;
even then, fast track passed the House by a mere 215-214 vote.325 Although
President Musharraf asked for a trade concession package worth $1.4 billion,
what Pakistan got was a package worth $476 million over three years with no
tariff reduction and some quota concessions in areas that were almost never filled
by Pakistan,326 such as woven blouses for women and girls, a category with only
eighteen percent of its 2001 quota used.327
Countries such as Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, India, and Morocco have all
pressed the U.S. to end subsidies for farmers and cut tariffs on agricultural and
apparel imports. All issued a joint statement in 2002 expressing their deep
317
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disappointment with how the U.S. has addressed their concerns thus far.328 U.S.
inability to loosen its protectionist stance on textiles and apparel was evident even
during the Doha Rounds of trade talk in December 2001, when it steadfastly
resisted “efforts by India and others to make textiles the litmus test of the rich
countries’ promise to launch a ‘development round’ of world trade talks that
would bring more benefits of globalization to poorer countries.”329 Textiles has
been at the center of the development debate “[s]ince Great Britain embarked on
its industrial revolution . . . [because] this sector has been a crucial steppingstone
for countries seeking to enter the modern industrialized age.” 330 Yet it is
precisely in this and other sectors in which poor countries have a comparative
advantage and “would have the best chance to work their way out of poverty”331
that developed countries have enacted the highest trade barriers. Pride and
prejudice again have tainted the trade debate in which rich countries continue to
hector and berate poor ones for their audacity to leverage their only comparative
advantage to trade with richer countries.
Critics of the domestic textile and apparel industry have pointedly noted that
even as all textile quotas would have had to be phased out by 2005 under WTO
rules,332 the industry nonetheless managed to “squash proposals to grant trade
benefits to Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—all key allies in the war on
terrorism. In other words, the protectionist lobby of a dying industry has quietly
become arguably the most effective domestic opponent of American foreign
policy.”333
The relationship between trade and national security is widely touted, but
zooming out and seeing this picture on an abstract level is one thing, while
implementing trade measures to ensure the national security interests of the U.S.
by advancing the economic development of key allies is another. In 2002, faced
with midterm Congressional elections and the possibility of losing Pennsylvania,
a steel-manufacturing state, President Bush decided to impose steep tariffs on
steel imports despite almost uniform international condemnation. Thus, “[t]he
president has decided that domestic political considerations take priority, even at
a time when America continues to need international support in the war against
terrorism,”334 especially from steel-producing countries such as Kazakhstan, a
U.S. ally bordering Afghanistan.335
Although national security interests and the war against terrorism have
undoubtedly shown that U.S. “security depends on ensuring that other countries
have a stake in the international system—which can only be done if the wealthy
nations lower their trade barriers.”336 It is also true that in the end,
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[t]rade policy presents hard tradeoffs between, on one hand, the
losses faced by those whose jobs and companies are vulnerable
to international competition and, on the other hand, the greater
but more diffuse national interest in a more competitive and
productive economy—and in promoting a more peaceful,
prosperous and equitable world.337
B. Trade and the U.S. Dollar
Without doubt, the U.S. has a unique advantage because the dollar is the
reserve currency of the world. This privileged position of the dollar is not
intrinsic. It is a reflection of American economic and political hegemony. This
privilege solidified after World War II when the U.S. was the undisputed
superpower that was not only the largest importer but also the primary source of
trade credit and the leading source of foreign capital; thus imports and exports
were invoiced in dollars.338 When central banks around the world needed to
stabilize their currencies against the dollar, banks held dollars in reserve.339
As this section demonstrates, the dollar will continue to be the international
reserve currency only if the U.S. is willing to maintain an open international
economic system. Other countries can hold and accumulate dollars only if they
can export freely in order to attain dollars. Restrictions on their exports will only
erode the dollar’s reserve status.
A foreign reserve currency is currency held by central banks and other major
financial institutions as a way to pay off international debt obligations and as a
means to influence their domestic exchange rate.340 The U.S. has engineered
through its political, economic and military power, the dollar’s supremacy
because this unique status has given it great advantages.
What does it mean for a currency to be the national currency of one country
but also the reserve currency of the world? Even international trade between or
among countries that have no contact with the U.S. is likely to be denominated in
dollars. For example, if Thailand buys Indian goods, it is more likely than not
that the payment will be in dollars and not in Thai baht. With dollars, India could
buy gold, oil, and other essential commodities on foreign markets. Such
commodities are all traded in dollars and as a result, all balance of payment
differences are settled in dollars.341 But to pay India in dollars, Thailand would
somehow have to acquire dollars in order to trade with India—usually by
exporting. The U.S., on the other hand, can buy anything from India and pay for
it with dollars which it can print any time. “[O]ther countries around the world
cannot simply create money to settle their current account deficits. This is a
privilege that accrues to [the] United States because of the dollar’s status as the
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reserve currency.”342
Once the dollar is the world’s reserve currency, every country needs dollars,
which in turn reinforces demand for the dollar. The dollar “has replaced gold as
being the standard mechanism of exchange between currencies.”343 Indeed,
eighty-five percent of all foreign exchange transactions are invoiced in dollars
while half of international debt securities are also accounted for in dollars.344 The
world’s central banks also hold close to $5 trillion of the bonds of the U.S.
treasury and other quasi-governmental agencies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac,345 and because they continue to desire these dollar securities, they are
willing to pay more to hold them. Investors also like to invest their dollars in a
safe dollar-denominated asset—the U.S. Treasury bond.
Because demand for U.S. Treasury bond is high, the yields on those bonds
are low, which in turn means the U.S. government can borrow money much
cheaper from the world than it would be able to if the dollar were not a highdemand reserve currency. Approximately $500 billion of American currency
circulates outside the U.S., which foreigners acquired, not because their
governments printed the dollars, but because they had had to provide the U.S.
with $500 billion of actual goods and services.346 “The American government has
taken full advantage of the hegemony as they currently borrow to the tune of
more than $2 billion daily.”347
As this section demonstrates, the U.S. is well aware of the privilege of dollar
dominance and has worked to ensure its continued use as top dog currency. After
World War II, the U.S. established an international monetary system that
inaugurated the dollar’s supremacy. Bretton Woods returned to the gold anchor
that preceded World War I but with a unique twist. The system was anchored to
gold through the dollar at a fixed price of thirty-five dollars an ounce. Other
currencies would fix their exchange rates to the dollar,348 which would be
convertible to gold. Thus, “[f]or foreign central banks and governments the
dollar was as good as gold, since the United States stood ready to sell gold at a
fixed price of $35 an ounce.”349 Although central banks could still accumulate
gold, the gold supply was limited, which made a currency such as the dollar more
appealing; moreover, the two main producers of gold were despised regimes—the
Soviet Union and South Africa—and so accumulating gold would mean
benefiting them.350
After World War II, war-ravaged Europe and Japan needed to import food
and materials for reconstruction. Armaments factories had to be converted for
peacetime production. It was in the interest of the U.S. for Europe and Japan to
export to earn dollars. But before either country could export, capital equipment
and other inputs had to be purchased to produce goods to export. Given the post342
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war dollar shortage, the Marshall Plan for Europe and the Dodge Plan for Japan
provided both with dollars so they could finance the purchases needed to
jumpstart exports. “In this sense the Marshall and Dodge Plans saved the Bretton
Woods System and, by implication, the international role of the dollar.”351
The dominance of the dollar meant great economic advantages for the
country and the American people. For example, U.S. consumers and investors
could buy foreign goods and acquire foreign companies by using dollars that
would be freely accepted. At the same time, the U.S. government did not have to
worry that the dollars accumulated by foreigners would be redeemed for gold,
because foreigners were willing to accept and keep dollars—as dollars were
presumably as good as gold. “This ability to purchase foreign goods and
companies using resources conjured out of thin air was the exorbitant privilege of
which French Finance Minister Valery Giscard d’Estaing so vociferously
complained.”352
From 1946 to 1971, the system worked well. Whenever there were
disruptions in the system, the U.S. issued statements assuring the world of the
stability of the dollar-anchored system. President Johnson declared, “[t]he
nations of the free world are united in their determination to keep the international
monetary system strong . . . .”353 Furthermore, “[he] reaffirm[ed] unequivocally
the commitment of the USA to buy and sell gold at the existing price of $35 an
ounce.”354
Pressure on the dollar began to build, however. For example, when Germany
and Japan, the two defeated World War II powers, denied military ambitions after
the war, focused on growing their economies instead, it was not long before they
became economic powerhouses and were able to accumulate—again, by
exporting—all the dollars they needed. If there are more foreign-held dollars than
U.S. gold holdings, the threat to the system could be serious if foreign holders all
demanded dollar to gold redemption. French President Charles De Gaulle
resented U.S. privileges “given the decline in the United States economic prowess
and the rising price of gold at that time.”355 France, followed by Spain, converted
much of their dollar reserves into gold.356 But the U.S. found help in Germany.
With its persistent trade surpluses and large dollar holdings, it was important that
Germany not exercise its right to convert dollars into gold. Germany sought to
preserve the security alliance with the U.S. In fact, in a secret agreement, the
President of the Deutsche Bundesbank assured the chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve that Germany would not exchange dollars for
gold.357
351
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Concern about the U.S., however, grew as the Vietnam War and President
Johnson’s antipoverty Great Society program became increasingly costly.
Although the U.S. “had built up a reservoir of economic strength at home and
political goodwill abroad . . . [,] that reservoir now slowly began to be drained.”358
Overseas dollar holders made relentless claims on the dollar and by March 1968,
at $35 per ounce, gold was now valued too low. The problem was “an excess of
paper money in relation to gold [and] [t]his excess money was reflected in rising
inflation in the United States, the United Kingdom and France.” 359 In 1971,
President Richard Nixon declared that the U.S. would no longer convert dollars
held by foreign central banks to gold or any other reserve assets and that it would
no longer intervene in the market to maintain the par value of the dollar against
gold.360
Despite the collapse of gold convertibility, dollar dominance was nonetheless
maintained361 because the U.S. was able to modify the system to prevent the
dollar from becoming “simply paper money” or fiat currency.362
As
Representative Ron Paul put it,
a new system was devised which allowed the U.S. to operate the
printing presses for the world reserve currency, with no
restraints placed on it, not even a presence of gold convertibility,
none whatsoever. . . . U.S. authorities struck an agreement with
OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries] to
price oil in U.S. dollars exclusively for all worldwide
transactions. This gave the dollar a special place among world
currencies, in essence backed the dollar with oil. In return, the
U.S. promised to protect the various oil-rich kingdoms in the
Persian Gulf against threat or invasion or domestic coup.363
Because of this deal, the dollar became the dominant currency in which
energy transactions would be denominated,364 boosting its status as a reserve
currency as governments all over needed to hold dollars in order to buy oil. In
this way,
any disrupting effects on the international foreign exchange and gold markets.”).
358
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[a]s emerging markets grow, they naturally accumulate foreign
reserves as a form of self-insurance. Central banks need the
funds to intervene in the foreign exchange market so that they
can prevent shocks to trade . . . . This capacity becomes more
important as previously closed economies open up and when
international markets are volatile . . . . It is only logical, in other
words, for emerging markets to accumulate reserves.365
And—this is key to the point made in this section of the Article—“to acquire
dollar reserves, countries must run current account surpluses with the United
States.”366
Dollar supremacy is not guaranteed. Critics have complained that the U.S.
“has not been a worthy steward of an international currency . . . ”367 because of its
heavy debt and chronic budget deficits. Russia and China are also interested in
challenging the dollar’s supremacy, proposing “the introduction of a new
international reserve currency that is to be created to replace the dominant U.S.
dollar . . . .”368 Both countries have entered into agreements to use their national
currencies and bypass the dollar when engaged in bilateral trade.369 Even as the
U.S. complained that China was manipulating its currency by devaluing it to
make its exports cheaper, China too has had its own complaints. In 2009, without
mentioning the dollar, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China called for the
establishment of a new international reserve currency: “The desirable goal of
reforming the international monetary system, therefore, is to create an
international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations and is
able to remain stable in the long run . . . .”370
Given all the privileges that come from being able to print the world’s reserve
currency, it is also important to understand the implications of this where trade is
concerned. If the dollar were to lose its status as the international reserve, the
U.S. would lose the ability to do business in other countries in its own currency,
the ability to borrow more cheaply than others countries, and the insurance policy
that comes with the dollar’s safe-haven status.371 For the U.S. to keep its dollar
privileges, it also needs to keep the international economic system open for trade.
But there is a built-in tension. Identified by the noted Belgian economist Robert
Triffin, the Triffin Dilemma stated that if the U.S. did not run trade deficits, that
is, if it was not willing to supply the trading system with an unlimited supply of
365
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dollars—for countries that received dollars when they exported—trade would
contract, growth would be stunted, and the contraction would damage the
international economic system.372 On the other hand, if the U.S. continued to run
trade deficits and hence provide an unlimited supply of dollars to the rest of the
world, confidence in the U.S. ability to convert dollars to gold would diminish.373
The point of this Article is not that the trade deficit is never a cause for concern.
It is rather that discussion of trade must be based on facts and must be situated in
a broader context, that is, in the wider international system that has maintained
dollar supremacy and international peace and prosperity since World War II.
Indeed, eliminating the trade deficit, as some have noted, “could mean giving
up some of the key levers of power that allow the United States to get its way in
international politics. Getting rid of the trade deficit could very well make
America less great.”374

CONCLUSION

There are legitimate disagreements on trade policy, whether a particular
measure is right or wrong, wealth-enhancing or wealth-reducing. But the debate
about trade has become increasingly strident, propelled by an entrenched view of
“us” versus “them” that is itself fueled by nationalistic and nativist rhetoric at
odds with the international economic order established since World War II.
Today, trade has become the battlefield on which “economic nationalism,
nativism, and identity politics”375 are being played out. This Article has argued
that policy differences aside, the gestalt of trade is one of openness. The trade
debate has been most heated in the area of job loss—how “we” have lost jobs to
“them.” I have shown that job loss due to technology and automation has
scarcely entered the national consciousness and has scarcely garnered
condemnation, much less outrage. Trade with others, especially the non-white
others outside the U.S. nationhood, has become the target of fear and anxieties
instead.
This Article does not claim that criticism of trade or of globalization
generally is wrong or off-limits. Indeed there is a wealth of scholarship that
addresses the benefits as well as problems of international trade. But the trade
debate must be grounded on clear-eyed facts, not pride and prejudice. By
focusing trade inward or zooming in, this Article shows that trade has been
transformed by global supply chains. Boundaries are thus blurred. Production is
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characterized by multilocation and products are “made in the world,” rarely in
one country. But trade statistics are still anachronistically founded on an oldworld view of monolocation at odds with facts on the ground. When imports and
exports figures are distorted because they exclude a value-added perspective that
would accurately reveal the many “contacts” a product has with the countries
embedded in the global supply chain, political debate about trade and trade
deficits is misshapen. Exaggerating these figures to show that the U.S. is
“losing,” and being “ripped off” by other countries allows opportunistic critics to
further fuel their agenda of economic nationalism. The U.S. continues to
dominate the upstream segments of global production, in both upstream
manufacturing and in the service component of trade. U.S. imports contain many
components the U.S. had itself exported. Manufacturing and services are
becoming more intertwined and less blurred. Protectionism in manufacturing will
harm the export sector and growing services sector of the U.S. economy.
Boundaries are blurred in other ways as well. Imports and exports are not
wholly separate and distinct components of trade but are two sides of the same
coin. In this vein, it is also important to understand that the trade deficit should
be viewed in a broader context and linked with investment. Take the trade deficit
with China as an example. If China acquired $366 billion of goods from the U.S.
and the U.S. acquired $482 billion of goods made in China, there is a $366 billion
trade deficit with China—although some economists have argued that from a
different perspective, “China ‘lost’ a net amount of $366 billion of goods that
ended up being consumed and enjoyed by Americans.”376 Regardless, the main
point is that the China paid for those goods with U.S. dollars. China took in “a
net amount of $366 billion worth of U.S. currency, the exact amount of the trade
deficit.”377 As this Article has demonstrated, this dollar amount returned to the
U.S. and the capital inflow is used to purchase U.S. assets like stocks and bonds,
real estate, U.S. Treasury securities and also as direct investment in the U.S.
economy.
Boundaries are indeed blurred. Merchandise and financial assets are linked.
The trade deficit is offset by a corresponding financial surplus and foreign
investment surplus. Thus there is no net loss. Indeed,
to constantly lament America's trade deficit is to lament the fact
that foreigners are eagerly investing hundreds of billions of
dollars in America every year. We shouldn’t think of trade
deficits as losing to countries such as China, but rather as
“inflows of foreign investment capital that strengthen America’s
economy.”378
Of course, economic nationalists have lamented about foreign “takeovers” when
foreigners, particularly non-Europeans, buy up American assets,379 showing the
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face of nativism, not economic rationalism.
Boundaries are blurred when one takes trade and zoom out as well, into two
related areas—national security and finances. Trade has been viewed as an
integral part of promoting peace among nations since the post-World War II era.
Indeed, the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 went to the EU, prompting some to joke
that the “Nobel committee congratulates Germany on over 70 years without
invading France.”380 But it is no joking matter that in fact, Germany has not
invaded France in seventy years or that the reduction of trade barriers within EU
countries has made poorer countries within the continent richer, and “that stopped
war.”381 The beginnings of the EU emerged from the establishment of the
European Coal and Steel Community following “a hard-headed proposal by
Robert Schuman, the then French foreign minister, to ensure that war could never
be fought again by France and Germany by pooling the two resources vital to
wage war—coal and steel.”382 Schuman’s famous declaration noted: “This
merging of our interests in coal and steel production and our joint action will
make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not only
unthinkable but materially impossible.”383 Thus, the idea that trade, connectivity,
and openness is conducive to peace is not new. But in the U.S. after September
11, this connection was elevated to a first-order national security level.
The boundary between trade and the supremacy of the dollar is also blurred.
The status of the dollar as an international reserve currency is dependent on an
international economic system that removes barriers, facilitates trade, and allows
foreigners who cannot print dollars to accumulate dollars, which in turn cements
dollar supremacy. In fact, from a nationalist standpoint, free trade and dollar
supremacy have been great for the U.S. It is, at the very least, ironic that trade is
under attack in the U.S. on nationalist grounds.
Although it is wholly understandable that people in certain industries and
sectors who have lost because of trade will be anxious, the solution is not to
demonize trade. It is, rather, to pursue policies that will harness the best elements
of globalization and moderate its worst ones via increased social safety nets,
outright cash payments, or trade adjustment assistance or job retraining.
As Oscar Wilde once said, “patriotism is the vice of nations.”384 Workers,
even those outside one’s nation—even those from poor, non-European
countries—should be allowed to trade openly and freely with others—this is in
fact, the basis of international trade if it were untainted by populist zeitgeist of
racialized identity politics and economic nationalism.
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